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I. KLEENUP'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF REVIEW WAS TIMELY FILED WITHIN
THE PARAMETERS OF THE UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT
Kleenup's Petition for Writ of Review was timely filed within the thirty-day period
following the deemed denial date of its Motion for Reconsideration under the parameters of Utah
Code Ann. § 63-46b-13(3) and -14(3). Kleenup filed a Motion for Reconsideration on February
20, 2002, and filed a Petition for Writ of Review on March 27, 2002. According to this Court's
interpretation of section 13(3) and -14(3), a party petitioning for judicial review of an
administrative order has two choices: file the petition within thirty days after the twenty-day
deemed denied period in section 63-46b-13(3) or file the petition within thirty days after the
agency issued its order denying the Motion for Reconsideration. 49th Street Galleria v. Tax
Comm 'n, 860 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah App. 1993). Appendix A.

See also Harper Investments, Inc.

v. Auditing Division, 868 P.2d 813, 815-16 (Utah 1994) ("... section 63-46b-14(3)(a) allows a
party to file a petition for judicial review within thirty days after the date on which an order was
issued or was considered to have been issued."). Appendix A.
The fact that in the instant case the Labor Commission purported to extend its response
time for issuing an order to March 31, 2002 does not remove Kleenup's option to file the Petition
after the twenty-day deemed denied date of March 12, 2002. As noted by the Utah Supreme
Court in Harper Investments, a potential petitioner who does not file within thirty days of the
deemed denial date assumes the risk of missing the deadline if the agency does not issue a final
order. Id. at 816. The Commission's purported extension did not establish a new deemed denied
date upon which Kleenup could rely in the event that the Commission failed to issue its order.
Moreover, McCoy's reliance on Maverik Country Stores Inc. v. Industrial Comm 'n9 860
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P.2d 944 (Utah App. 1993) is misplaced. Appendix A.

The facts, circumstances and pertinent

statutory review of the Maverik case are neither analogous nor relevant to the instant case. In
Maverik, the petitioners filed a Writ of Review with this Court on the ALJ's order without first
seeking the agency review required by statute, and subsequently filed a Motion for Review for
agency review with the Industrial Commission while the Writ of Review was pending so that
there were simultaneous judicial review and agency review proceedings on the same order. Id. at
947. There was no Motion for Reconsideration filed; indeed, at the time the petitioner filed the
Writ of Review there was not even a Motion for Review before the Commission.
II. KLEENUP MARSHALED EVIDENCE THAT WAS PROPERLY BEFORE THE
LABOR COMMISSION AND MCCOY'S RELIANCE ON MA VERIK IS MISPLACED.
McCoy assails Kleenup for marshaling evidence that she asserts is not properly before the
Court, specifically McCoy's deposition and an affidavit from Dr. Tarbet. However, her claims
are without merit. "It is important to note that the [Labor] Commission, not the ALJ, is the
ultimate finder of fact. Virgin v. Board of Review, 803 P.2d 1284, 1287 (Utah App. 1990).
Appendix A. Thus, it is not "new evidence" before the Court insofar as this same evidence was
submitted to the ultimate finder of fact, the Labor Commission, and available pursuant to its
review of the ALJ's order. Of note, the statutory provision for admission of evidence in Utah
Code Ann.§ 34A-2-802 states, in part, with our emphasis, "The commission may received as
evidence and use as proof of any fact in dispute all evidence deemed material and relevant...."
The deposition was included in Kleenup's Motion for Review submitted to the Commission as
the ultimate fact finder, and thus is properly part of the record in this case. Moreover, McCoy
did not object to the deposition's inclusion in the record at the time she responded to Kleenup's
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Motion for Review; any ensuing objection on appeal before this Court is waived. See Esquivel v.
Labor Commission, 2000 UT 66 \ 34, 7 P.3d 782.f 21-23, 973 P.2d 440 (Utah App. 1999)
Likewise, Dr. Tarbet's affidavit was included in the record by the Labor Commission, as
indicated by the index transmitted by the Commission to this Court. Appendix B.

Kleenup

submitted this affidavit to the Labor Commission after the hearing before the ALJ. Because the
Labor Commission included the affidavit in the record of this case, presumably the Commission
considered it as evidence during its review of the record.
Petitioner relies on the King v. Industrial Comm % 850 P.2d 1281 (Utah App. 1993) in
stating that temporary total disability benefits are owed even if the control of the situation is out
of the hands of the employer. However, King is easily distinguishable from this case. In King,
the Petitioner was awarded temporary total disability benefits because he was not medically
stable. King was given a light duty release. King was scheduled for surgery and just prior to the
surgery, was incarcerated in jail and the temporary total disability benefits had to continue being
paid because he was still completely and totally disabled. It did not matter if King was in or out
of jail, his doctor said that he could not work. Conversely, in this case, no temporary total
disability benefits had been awarded when Petitioner quit her job. In fact, there is no concurrent
medical evidence that supports Petitioner's claim that she should have been on light duty
restrictions. The only concurrent evidence that supports her claim for light duty was her own
self-serving testimony. The big difference between King and this case is that the employer could
have provided light duty employment had Petitioner been able to produce a medical release
giving her light duty.
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III. KLEENUP HAS NOT WAIVED ITS RIGHT TO ASSERT THAT MCCOY'S
HEARSAY STATEMENTS CANNOT BE RELIED UPON AS FOUNDATION FOR
FINDINGS OF FACT.
{

McCoy incorrectly contends that Kleenup waived its right to deem evidence as hearsay
by failing to object to her hearsay statements in the evidentiary hearing. However, her
statements and ensuing analysis are flawed. As we have previously stated, hearsay statements
are admissible evidence in administrative proceedings. Hoskings v. Industrial Comm 'n, 918
P.2d 150,155 (Utah App. 1996) Petitioner's Brief Appendix J. Further, "hearsay statements are
admissible even if objected to during the course of an administrative hearing. Id. Thus, whether
or not a party objects to a hearsay statement in an administrative proceeding is of no
consequence because such an objection has no force or effect on the statement's admissibility.
The matter of hearsay in the administrative forum requires some clarification. There are
two types of hearsay evidence that may be introduced in an administrative hearing: hearsay
statements that fall under the array of exceptions to Utah R. Evid. 803 and thus are admissible in
a court of law, i.e., the judicial forum, and pure hearsay statements as defined by Utah R. Evid.
801 which are not admissible in a court of law. Although pure hearsay may be properly
introduced in the hearing, the ALJ is precluded from solely relying on such evidence in
promulgating his or her findings of fact. Hoskings, 918 P.2d at 155. As was shown in the
defendant's brief, Judge Hann relied solely on the claimant's testimony that she needed light
duty when she quit her job with Kleenup. Petitioner stated that she told several medical
providers about her alleged condition; yet, not one of the concurrent medical records supports her
testimony. Consequently, Judge Hann erred when she accepted the hearsay testimony as fact
when the medical records did not support this claim.
4
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CONCLUSION
Because the defendants' brief was timely filed and the defendants properly marshaled the
evidence, the petitioner's claims are without merit. Moreover, the defendants raised their
objection to Judge Hann's reliance on hearsay evidence, which was in violation of the residuum
rule, when they filed their motion for review. Consequently, defendants ask this Court to reverse
the Labor Commission's decision in its award of retroactive temporary disability benefits.

DATED this 18th day of October, 2002

Eugege C. Miller Jr., Counsel foi^Petitioners
Utaii Disaster Kleenup and Workers
Compensation Fund
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860 P.2d 996, 49th Street Galleria v. Tax Com'n, Auditing Div., (Utah App. 1993)
*996 860P.2d996
Court of Appeals of Utah.
The 49TH STREET GALLERIA, Petitioner,
v.
TAX COMMISSION, AUDITING DIVISION,
State of Utah, Respondent.
Alan V. Funk, Coopers & Lybrand, Intervenor.
No. 930053-CA.
Oct. 7, 1993.
Amusement arcade sought review of decision by state
Tax Commission requiring collection of sales tax on
fees collected for alleged "admission" to batting cages,
laser tag game, and roller skating rink. The Court of
Appeals, Orme, J., held that fee charged was for use of
particular games and not for admission to particular
place, and, thus, sales tax could not be imposed.
Reversed.
West Headnotes
[1] Taxation <S=>493.3
371 —
371V Levy and Assessment
371V(G) Review, Correction, or Setting Aside of
Assessment
371V(G)2 Proceedings Before Board or Officer
37lk493 Review by Courts
371k493.3 Time of Taking Proceedings.
Party may file petition for judicial review of Tax
Commission's finding within 30 days after order
constituting final agency action "or" within 30 days
after "deemed denied" date so that, where Tax
Commission denied motion for reconsideration more
than 30 days after its final action, petition for review of
denial filed within 30 days of disposition was timely.
U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-13(3)(a, b).
[2] Administrative Law and Procedure ^ ^ O O
15A —
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
15AV(E) Particular Questions, Review of
15Ak800 Statutory Questions.
[See headnote text below]
[2] Taxation <§=> 1319
371 —
371XVI Sales, Use, Service, and Gross Receipts
Taxes
371XVI(C) Assessment, Payment, and Enforcement
371XVI(C)1 Levy and Assessment
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371kl319 Judicial Review and Relief Against
Assessments.
Because Tax Commission does not have explicit
grant of discretion, its action in interpreting scope of
sales tax on "admissions" had to be reviewed without
deference and for correctness. U.C.A.1953, 59-1-610,
59-12-103, 59-12-103(l)(f).
[3] Taxation <§=> 1231.1
371 —
371XVI Sales, Use, Service, and Gross Receipts
Taxes
371XVI(B) Tax Liability and Exemptions
371XVI(B)1 Transactions Taxable in General
371kl231 Subjects and Exemptions in General
371kl231.1 In General.
Tax Commission could not require sales tax to be
charged for "admissions" based on fees charged for use
of batting cages, roller rink, and laser tag absent
showing that fee was charged for right to enter place
rather than being charged for right to use facilities or
equipment within the place; use of laser tag or roller
skating areas was no different from use of bowling
lanes and batting cages, for which no sales tax was
applied.
[4] Taxation <&» 1231.1
371 —
371XVI Sales, Use, Service, and Gross Receipts
Taxes
371XVI(B) Tax Liability and Exemptions
371XVI(B)1 Transactions Taxable in General
371kl231 Subjects and Exemptions in General
371kl231.1 In General.
Amusement arcade was not liable for admission tax
on activities such as roller skating, use of batting cages,
and laser tag in light of showing that no fee was
charged by arcade for admission to any place but rather
fee was charged only to perform particular activities.
U.C.A.1953, 59-1-610, 59-l-610(l)(b), (2), 63-46b-l
et seq., 63-46b-13(3)(b), 63-46b-16(4)(h)(ii).
LaVar F. Christensen, Midvale, for petitioner.
Jan Graham and John C. McCarrey, Salt Lake City,
for respondent.
Stephen W. Rupp, Salt Lake City, for intervenor.
Before BENCH, JACKSON and ORME, JJ.
OPINION
ORME, Judge:
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860 P.2d 996, 49th Street Galleria v. Tax Com'n, Auditing Div., (Utah App. 1993)
The 49th Street Galleria seeks our review of a
decision by the Utah State Tax Commission requiring
the collection of a sales tax by the Galleria on fees
collected for "admission" to its batting cages, laser tag
game, and roller skating rink under Utah Code Ann. §
59-12-103 (1992). (FN1) We reverse *997 on the
basis that no admission fee, of the sort contemplated in
the statute, is charged by the Galleria.
FACTS
In 1984, the Galleria opened for business as an
indoor entertainment mall in Murray, Utah. The mall
houses arcade games, video machines, a bowling alley,
a miniature golf course, amusement rides, roller
skating, batting and pitching cages, food concessions,
and laser tag. (FN2) The public may enter the Galleria
without charge, and tables and seats are placed
throughout the mall for the public to use free of charge.
Fees are assessed only when an individual decides to
participate in one of the many available activities.
Turning to the activities at issue in this case, a batting
cage consists of a fenced area containing a machine
that pitches baseballs or softballs to customers standing
within the cage. The machine is operated either by
tokens or by cash payment to an attendant. An
individual pays to have the ball delivered by the
machine. A fee is not charged for simply entering the
batting cage and, indeed, coaches are allowed to stand
in the cage and advise the batter without paying an
admission charge.
The record contains a less detailed description of
laser tag, but indicates it is operated in a manner
similar to the batting cages. The Tax Commission's
findings state that "[u]pon payment of a cash fee,
customers were provided laser guns and sensing
devices and engaged in mock combat in an enclosed
area." In the roller skating operation, an individual is
allowed to "skate for a period of time upon payment of
cash," while parents and other onlookers may enter the
skating facility and observe without charge.
In the spring of 1984, the Galleria requested the
Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission
to determine whether the Galleria's activities would be
subject to Utah sales tax. Kenneth Cook of the
Auditing Division informed the Galleria that receipts
from the batting cages and roller skating rink would be
subject to tax, while, apparently, fees for bowling and
miniature golf would not be. The Galleria then sought
additional review. In August of 1984, George M.
Loertscher of the Auditing Division informed the
Galleria that roller skating, batting cages, miniature
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golf, and bowling were not subject to sales tax.
Relying on Loertscher's letter, the Galleria did not
collect sales tax on the activities identified. (FN3)
When the Galleria subsequently added laser tag to its
repertoire of amusements, it continued its consistent
practice of not collecting sales tax on these activities.
Some years later, the Auditing Division undertook a
routine compliance audit. This time it was determined
that the Galleria was required to collect an admission
tax on fees collected for use of its batting cages, roller
skating rink, and laser tag amusement, but not on the
corresponding fees for bowling and miniature golf.
The Galleria sought agency review of the assessment
and the Tax Commission, in a decision dated
November 20, 1991, held that fees for use of the
batting cages, roller skating, and *998 laser game
were payments for "admission" subject to sales tax.
(FN4) The Galleria then sought reconsideration, and
the Tax Commission denied that request by decision
dated March 10, 1992. (FN5) The Galleria now seeks
judicial review of the Tax Commission's determination
that fees for the use of the batting cages, roller skating
rink, and laser tag game are subject to Utah sales tax
under Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(l)(f) (1992).
JURISDICTION
Before addressing the merits of this case, we must
first determine whether the petition for judicial review
was timely filed. The Tax Commission issued its final
decision on November 20, 1991, and the Galleria
petitioned the Commission for reconsideration on
December 10. The Auditing Division filed its brief in
opposition to reconsideration on January 3, 1992, and
the Galleria replied on January 21. The Tax
Commission issued its order denying the petition for
reconsideration on March 10, 1992, and the Galleria
filed its petition for judicial review within thirty days
of that disposition.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13(3)(b)
(1989), a request for administrative reconsideration is
"deemed denied" if an order is not issued by the agency
within twenty days after the filing of the request. (FN6
) The Tax Commission did not issue its order denying
reconsideration within twenty days of December 10,
1991, but rather some three months later, on March 10,
1992. Despite its own delay in disposing of the
reconsideration request, the Tax Commission now
argues that, under section 63-46b-13(3)(b), its order is
deemed to have been issued on December 30, 1991,
and the Galleria's petition for review is untimely
because it was not filed within thirty days of that date,
as required by Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(a)

Copyright (c) West Group 2002 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

860 P.2d 996, 49th Street Galleria v. Tax Com'n, Auditing Div., (Utah App. 1993)
(1989). That provision states:
A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final
agency action within 30 days after the date that the
order constituting the final agency action is issued or
is considered to have been issued under Subsection
63-46b-13(3)(b).
Id. (emphasis added). The Tax Commission simply
ignores the disjunctive term "or" found in section
63-46b-14(3)(a) and interprets the statute to mean that
if an order is not issued within the twenty day "deemed
denied" period, the thirty-day jurisdictional clock for
judicial review begins irretrievably to run. (FN7)
*999 [1] We disagree. A plain reading of the statute
indicates that a party may file a petition for judicial
review within thirty days after the order constituting
the final agency action, in this case the order denying
reconsideration issued on March 10, 1992, "or " within
thirty days after the "deemed denied" date established
by section 63-46b-13(3)(b). In the instant case, the
Galleria filed its petition for review within thirty days
of the Tax Commission's March 10 final order and this
court therefore has jurisdiction to hear the case. (FN8)
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review the agency action for reasonableness. Morton
Int'l, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 587-88
(Utah 1991). See, e.g., SEMECO Indus., Inc. v. State
Tax Comm'n, 849 P.2d 1167, 1173 (Utah 1993)
(Durham, J., dissenting); Nucor Corp. v. State Tax
Comm'n, 832 P.2d 1294, 1296 (Utah 1992). Section
59-1-610 requires this court to depart from its prior
practice and, in the case of the Tax Commission, to
refrain from reviewing agency action under a
deferential standard unless there is an explicit grant of
discretion. Since the statute at issue, section 59-12-103
, does not contain language which would even arguably
constitute an explicit grant of discretion to the Tax
Commission, (FN 10) the commission's action in
interpreting the scope of the sales tax on "admissions"
must be reviewed without deference and for
correctness.
*1000 UTAH'S ADMISSION TAX
Utah imposes a sales tax on the amount paid or
charged by a purchaser for
admission to any place of amusement, entertainment,
or recreation, including seats and tables reserved or
otherwise, and other similar accommodations^]

STANDARD OF REVIEW
[2] Our analysis of tax cases is guided by the
standards of review announced in Utah Code Ann. §
59-1-610 (Supp.1993). OSI Indus., Inc. v. State Tax
Comm'n, 860 P.2d 381, 383 (Utah App. 1993) (because
section 59-1-610 is procedural, it applies retroactively).
See Miller Welding Supply, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n,
860 P.2d 361 (Utah App. 1993) (applying section
59-1-610 to a sales tax case involving an audit
conducted between 1987 and 1989). But see Thorup
Bros. Constr., Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 860 P.2d 324
(Utah 1993). (FN9) Section 59-1-610 directs this
court to
grant the commission no deference concerning its
conclusions of law, applying a correction of error
standard, unless there is an explicit grant of discretion
contained in a statute at issue before the appellate
court.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-l-610(l)(b) (Supp.1993)
(emphasis added). This statute supersedes the Utah
Administrative Procedures Act insofar as it pertains to
judicial review of formal adjudicative proceedings. Id.
§ 59-1-610(2). Prior to the recent enactment of section
59-1-610, it was the mandate of this court to determine
whether the Legislature had, either explicitly or
implicitly, granted an agency discretion and, if so, to

Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(l)(f) (1992) (emphasis
added).
The Tax Commission has adopted rules interpreting
the key language of the admission tax.
Utah
Administrative Code R865-19-33S(A) (1993) (FN11)
specifically states in pertinent part:
A. "Admission" means the right or privilege to enter
into a place. Admission includes the amount paid for
the right to use a reserved seat or any seat in an
auditorium, theater, circus, stadium, schoolhouse,
meeting house, or gymnasium to view any type of
entertainment. Admission also includes the right to
use a table at a night club, hotel, or roof garden
whether such charge is designated as a cover charge,
minimum charge, or any such similar charge.
Aside from its elaboration on seats and tables, not
applicable here, this rule speaks in terms of the right to
enter a place and not in terms of a fee charged to use
facilities or equipment within a place. As such, the rule
merely incorporates the plain and settled meaning of
"admission."
See, e.g., Webster's Third New
International Dictionary 28 (1976) (defining admission
disinter alia, "an act of admitting ...; permission or
right to enter").
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[3][4] Neither the existence nor the content of the
interpretive rule defining "admission" is meaningfully
challenged in the instant proceeding. The single issue
for us, then, is this: Assuming the rule reflects the
correct interpretation of the statute, as seems
inarguable, did the Tax Commission decide correctly
that sales tax on admissions should be assessed on the
fees charged by the Galleria for the use of batting
cages, the roller rink, and laser tag? While the Tax
Commission "recognizes that distinctions between
[bowling and batting cages] are difficult to draw,"
(FN 12) we hold no meaningful distinction can be
drawn for purposes of the admissions tax, given the
Tax Commission's own interpretation of "admission."
Not only does the record indicate no fee is charged
for the right or privilege to enter the Galleria, but
individuals such as coaches may enter the batting cage
without paying an admission fee. The situation is
apparently no different for laser tag or roller skating.
Consequently, the Tax Commission erred in departing
from its traditional application of the rule. The rule
states that admission means the "right to enter a place."
There is simply no fee charged by the Galleria for
admission to any place; there are only fees charged to
do particular things. (FN13) Thus, given the Tax
Commission's own interpretation of the statute, as
memorialized in its rule, its decision in this case is
incorrect.
*1001. CONCLUSION
The Tax Commission's decision that the Galleria is
liable for an admission tax on the activities of roller
skating, batting cages, and laser tag is therefore
reversed.
BENCH and JACKSON, JJ., concur.
(FN1.) The applicable statute provides, in pertinent
part, as follows:
(1) There is levied a tax on the purchaser for the
amount paid or charged for the following:

(f) admission to any place of amusement,
entertainment, or recreation, including seats and
tables reserved or otherwise, and other similar
accommodations[.]
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(l)(f) (1992).
The audit that resulted in the imposition of tax
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liability was for the period of July 1, 1986, through
June 30, 1989. The substantive law then in effect
governs this dispute. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v.
State Tax Comm'n, 839 P.2d 303, 306 (Utah 1992).
Nonetheless, both parties cite to the 1992 version of
the Utah Code Annotated. That version is identical
to the law in effect for the period from January 1,
1987, to the present. However, between July 1, 1986,
and January 1, 1987, the statutory language was more
succinct and simply stated that the tax was due on any
"amount paid for admission to any place of
amusement, entertainment, or recreation." Utah Code
Ann. § 59-15-4(l)(d) (Supp.1986). Since the instant
case does not involve facts contemplated by the
statutory language added as of January 1, 1987, we
follow the parties' lead in citing the current version of
the code.
(FN2.) Laser tag was not offered when the Galleria
first opened and has since been discontinued, but it
was offered during the period of the audit.
(FN3.) Equipment rental is a separate matter. The
Galleria has routinely collected sales tax on the rental
of bowling shoes and roller skates by those patrons
who do not provide their own equipment. The
taxability of such transactions is not in issue.
(FN4.) Because of the conflicting advice provided by
the Auditing Division, the Tax Commission held that
the Galleria would not be liable for the tax due on the
roller skating and batting cage receipts during the
period of the audit, but only prospectively.
The Tax Commission now argues that because the tax
is not being assessed against roller skating and
batting cage receipts for the audit period, the issue is
moot and any decision on the future taxability of
those receipts is simply an advisory opinion. We
disagree.
"A case is deemed moot when the
requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the
litigants." Burkett v. Schwendiman, 111 P.2d 42, 44
(Utah 1989). A determination by this court will
affect the rights of the litigants. Furthermore, the
issue has been fully briefed and is squarely before us.
It is clear the real dispute has always been whether
the tax is applicable to these activities, not simply
whether the tax is due for any particular period.
(FN5.) In its order denying reconsideration, the
Commission explicitly recognized that the distinction
between taxing batting cages and bowling was
difficult to draw and that the disparate treatment
might not exist if a new look at the bowling issue
were undertaken. In a letter dated August 7, 1986,
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Jim Roger, then Director of the Auditing Division,
recognized that "[t]he Auditing Division has for quite
some time had some questions about which activities
come under the definition of an admission."
(FN6.) The "deemed denied" provision states in its
entirety:
If the agency head or the person designated for that
purpose does not issue an order within 20 days after
the filing of the request, the request for
reconsideration shall be considered to be denied.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13(3)(b) (1989).
(FN7.) In the Tax Commission's view, the parties'
briefs filed with and accepted by the commission in
January of 1992 were for naught, although accepted
by the commission when tendered, because they were
filed more than twenty days after December 10, and
the commission's multiple page order of denial,
issued weeks later, was a completely meaningless
gesture.
(FN8.) We note that Lopez v. Career Services Review
Board, 834 P.2d 568, 571-72 (Utah App.), cert
denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992), relied on by the
Tax Commission, does not support its position. The
Lopez court was concerned with the legal significance
of a letter issued within the twenty day "deemed
denied" period of § 63-46b-13(3)(b) and whether it
qualified as an order so as to start the thirty-day
jurisdictional time then, rather than upon the elapse
of twenty days.
The instant case presents a
completely different question because the agency's
final order was issued well beyond the twenty-day
period.
*1001_ (FN9.) In Thorup, decided after both OS1 and
Miller Welding, the Supreme Court reviewed whether
the Tax Commission's action was contrary to one of
the commission's rules under a reasonableness and
rationality standard, citing the Utah Administrative
Procedure Act. Utah Code Ann.§ 63-46b-16(4)(h)(ii)
(1989). It is unclear from the decision, since Utah
Code Ann. § 59-1-610 was not mentioned, whether
the new statute was simply not considered by the
Court or whether the Court decided it was
inapplicable, either by its terms or because the Court
does not subscribe to the retroactivity conclusion of
OS! and Miller Welding.
In the face of such
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ambiguity, it is prudent to follow the clear holdings of
the previous decisions of this court. See State v.
Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1269 (Utah 1993).
(FN 10.) The case law indicates that where the Tax
Commission has been held to have discretion in the
interpretation and application of the sales tax statute,
that delegation is implicit. Compare Union Pac. R.R.
v. State Tax Comm'n, 842 P.2d 876, 884-85 (Utah
1992) (decided before the adoption of § 59-1-610 and
finding a grant of discretion without stating whether it
is explicit or implicit) with SEMECO Indus., Inc. v.
State Tax Comm'n, 849 P.2d 1167, 1175-76 (Utah
1993) (Durham, J., dissenting) (finding implicit
delegation to interpret terms within Utah's sales tax
statute). See also Morton Int'l, Inc. v. State Tax
Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 588 (Utah 1991).
(FN11.) We cite to the most recent version of the Utah
Administrative Code as a convenience to the reader.
The portions of the rules quoted in this opinion were
the same, in all material respects, throughout the
audit period.
(FN12.) The Tax Commission, as admitted in the
order denying the petition for reconsideration in this
case, has consistently taken the position that bowling
is not subject to the sales tax on admission fees. Nor
have fees for golfing, tennis, racquetball, miniature
golf, or driving ranges been subject to the tax. The
Tax Commission's application of its rule vis-a-vis
bowling and these other activities appears to be
correct because no admission fee is customarily
charged for the "right or privilege to enter," for
instance, a bowling alley.
(FN 13.) Language in another rule, which rule is
vigorously challenged by the Galleria, defines "place
of amusement." That rule has verbiage consistent
with the Tax Commission's position. See Utah
Admin.Code R865-19-34S (1993) ("sale of a ticket
for a ride upon a mechanical or self-operated device
is an admission to a place of amusement"). However,
given the scheme of § 59-12-103(l)(f), the meaning
of the terms "place of amusement, entertainment, or
recreation" becomes relevant only if the threshold
determination of an "admission" had been shown.
Thus, because we hold the fees charged by the
Galleria for use of the batting cages, etc., are not for
admission, we need not go on to decide whether those
venues qualify as "place[s] of amusement,
entertainment, or recreation."
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*813 868P.2d813
Supreme Court of Utah.
HARPER INVESTMENTS, INC., Harper Sand
and Gravel, Inc.,
Harper Excavating, Inc., and Harper Contracting,
Inc., Petitioners,
v.
AUDITING DIVISION, UTAH STATE TAX
COMMISSION, Respondent.
No. 920310.
Feb. 2, 1994.
Sand and gravel companies appealed decision of
State Tax Commission assessing sales taxes. The
Supreme Court, Zimmerman, C.J., held that: (1) fact
that companies filed request for judicial review of
decision more than 30 days from date of decision did
not compel finding that request was not timely, where
Commission had granted extension of time for
petitioning for reconsideration of decision and
taxpayers had petitioned for judicial review within 30
days of granting of extension;
(2) fact that
Commission took no action for over 20 days on
companies' petition for reconsideration of decision did
not compel finding that 30-day period for seeking
judicial review of decision began 20 days after petition
was filed, where Commission ultimately issued order
denying petition for reconsideration; and (3) sales
taxes were improperly assessed for purported sale of
sand and gravel between companies, since purported
sales existed in accounting records but had no basis in
reality, and resulted from good faith error in
accounting methods.
Reversed.
Howe, J., dissented and filed opinion.
West Headnotes
[1] Taxation <§=> 1319
371 —
371XVI Sales, Use, Service, and Gross Receipts
Taxes
371XVI(C) Assessment, Payment, and Enforcement
371XVI(C)1 Levy and Assessment
371kl319 Judicial Review and Relief Against
Assessments.
Fact that taxpayers filed request for judicial review of
State Tax Commission decision assessing sales taxes
more than 30 days from date of Commission's decision
did not compel finding that request was not timely,
where Commission had granted extension of time for
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petitioning for reconsideration of decision and
taxpayers petitioned for judicial review within 30 days
after Commission issued order denying petition for
reconsideration; granting of extension operated to
extend date on which agency decision became "final"
by tolling 30-day period for seeking judicial review.
U.C.A.1953, 59-1-610, 63-46b-l(9), 63-46b-13(l)(a,
b), 63-46b-14, 63-46b-14(3)(a).
[2] Taxation <S=> 1318
371 —
371XVI Sales, Use, Service, and Gross Receipts
Taxes
371XVI(C) Assessment, Payment, and Enforcement
371XVI(C)1 Levy and Assessment
371kl318 Administrative Review.
Fact that State Tax Commission took no action for
over 20 days on taxpayers' petition for reconsideration
of decision assessing sales taxes did not compel
finding, under statute providing that such petition is
deemed denied if no action is taken by Commission
within 20 days, that 30-day period for seeking judicial
review of decision assessing sales taxes began 20 days
after petition was filed, where Commission ultimately
issued order denying petition for reconsideration;
actual date of issuance of order marked beginning of
30-day period.
U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-13(3)(b),
63-46b-14(3)(a).
[3] Taxation <®=> 1234
371 —
371'XVI Sales, Use, Service, and Gross Receipts
Taxes
371XVI(B) Tax Liability and Exemptions
371XVI(B)1 Transactions Taxable in General
371kl234 Nature of Transaction in General.
Sales taxes were improperly assessed for purported
sales of sand and gravel which existed in accounting
records but had no basis in reality; following parent
company's restructuring in which its assets were
transferred to three wholly owned subsidiaries, good
faith accounting error resulted in a sale being
erroneously reflected every time material was
transferred from one subsidiary to another.
*814 Robert A. Peterson, Richard C. Skeen, and
Robert W. Payne, Salt Lake City, for petitioners.
Jan Graham, Arty. Gen. and Clark L. Snelson, Asst.
Arty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for respondent.
ZIMMERMAN, Chief Justice:
Harper Investments, Inc., Harper Sand and Gravel,
Inc., Harper Excavating, Inc., and Harper Contracting,
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Inc. (collectively referred to as "Harper Companies"),
appeal from a decision of the Utah State Tax
Commission ("Commission") that assessed them
$582,273.93 in sales taxes arising from the sale of sand
and gravel. The Harper Companies argue that this
assessment was in error because it did not arise from
actual sales, but from an erroneous in-house accounting
treatment of the transactions in question. We agree and
reverse.
The material facts are not in dispute. Harper
Excavating, Inc., operated a business involving
excavating, cleaning, hauling, and distributing sand,
gravel, and other materials. In 1986, for reasons not
relevant here, Harper Excavating restructured by
transferring its assets to three new wholly owned
subsidiaries-Harper Sand and Gravel, Harper
Investments, (FN1) and Harper Contracting. Harper
Excavating, the new parent corporation, later changed
its name to Harper Investments.
These corporate changes required a restructuring of
the manner in which the new group of companies
accounted for transactions with third parties and among
themselves. Controller Steven Goddard, who was
solely responsible for setting up the new accounting
procedures, distributed on the books the various assets
owned by the former Harper Excavating to the three
subsidiaries. Goddard thought he was distributing
these assets in accordance with underlying legal and
physical realities. However, he erred. He accounted
one of those assets, a group of sand and gravel sales
agreements, as property of Harper Sand and Gravel. In
fact, the sales contracts had already been assigned to
Harper Contracting. As a result of this error, every
time material covered by those contracts was delivered
by Harper Contracting, the books reflected a sale from
Harper Sand and Gravel to Harper Contracting. The
Harper Companies did not discover Goddard's error
until the Commission reviewed the companies' books in
1988 and assessed liability for unpaid taxes on "intraunit" sales.
The Commission gave notice of the tax deficiencies
on September 28, 1990. On October 26, 1990, the
Harper Companies petitioned for redetermination, and
a hearing was held on July 30, 1991. On January 9,
1992, the Commission issued findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and a final decision affirming the
original sales tax assessment. Although the decision
affected each individual company, a copy was mailed
only to Harper Investments in care of its counsel, Van
Cott, Bagley, Cornwall and McCarthy. None of the
four individual petitioners or their counsel received a
copy of the decision until February 20th, forty-two

Page 2

days after it was issued. As a result, the twenty-day
period provided in the Code for filing a petition for
reconsideration had expired. See Utah Code Ann. §
63-46b-13(l)(a). The Harper Companies then sought
an extension *815 of time within which to file their
petition for reconsideration.
That extension was
granted under authority of section 63-46b-l(9), and the
Harper Companies filed a petition for reconsideration
on May 4, 1992. The Commission, however, denied
the petition in a final order dated June 3, 1992. The
Harper Companies filed a petition for review of agency
action with this court on July 1, 1992, claiming that the
Commission erred in assessing sales taxes that were
based solely on a good faith error in an accounting
procedure.
We first address the standard of review. The
Commission's decision raises questions of law. "We
grant the Commission no deference concerning its
conclusions of law, applying a correction-of-error
standard, unless there is an explicit grant of discretion
contained in a statute at issue before the appellate
court." Utah Code Ann. § 59-l-610(l)(b) (Supp.1993)
; see also Board of Equalization v. State Tax Comm fn
ex rel Benchmark, Inc., 864 P.2d 882, 884 (1993)
(holding that section 59-1-610 applies to actions
commenced before its effective date). The statutes at
issue do not grant the Commission any discretion in
their interpretation. See 49th Street Galleria v. Tax
Comm'n, 860 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah Ct.App.1993)
("[S]ection 59-12-103[ ] does not contain language
which would even arguably constitute an explicit grant
of discretion to the Tax Commission...."). Therefore,
the no-deference standard applies.
[1] The Commission asserts that the Harper
Companies missed the statutory deadline for obtaining
judicial review under section 63-46b-14.
That
provision requires a request for review to be made
within thirty days from the date the agency decision is
issued or deemed to have been issued. Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-14(3)(a). Because the final decision was
dated January 9, 1992, and review was not sought until
July 1, 1992, the Commission claims that section
63-46b-14 bars our consideration of the matter. The
Commission further argues that it did not extend the
time limit for seeking judicial review when it granted
an extension of time for filing a petition for
reconsideration. For this argument, the Commission
relies on section 63-46b-l(9), which provides,
"Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to restrict a
presiding officer, for good cause shown, from
lengthening or shortening any time period prescribed in
this chapter, except those time periods established for
judicial review." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(9).
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We do not agree with the Commission's position.
The Commission did not purport to extend the thirtyday limit for seeking judicial review. Rather, it
extended the time for petitioning for reconsideration.
The Code allows a petitioner to seek reconsideration of
an agency decision within twenty days or to seek
immediate judicial review within thirty days of a final
decision and forego any further agency action. Utah
Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-13(l)(a)-(b), -14(3)(a). In this
case, the Harper Companies sought a "good cause"
extension of time to seek reconsideration, which the
Commission granted. This extension operated to
extend the date on which the agency decision became
"final" by tolling the thirty-day period for seeking
judicial review. Because the Commission did not deny
the petition for reconsideration until June 3, 1992, we
conclude that the July 1st filing for judicial review was
timely.
[2] In the alternative, the Commission argues that the
Harper Companies were tardy in seeking judicial
review because the Code provides that a petition for
reconsideration is "deemed denied" if no action is
taken by the agency within twenty days of the petition.
See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13(3)(b).
The
Commission claims that the thirty-day period for
seeking judicial review began to run on May 25, 1992,
twenty days from the day on which the Harper
Companies petitioned for reconsideration. As a result,
the Commission argues, the July 1st filing for judicial
review was past the thirty-day period.
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because the Commission chose to consider the petition
for reconsideration and to act on it by issuing an order,
the period for seeking review did not begin to run until
the date of that final opinion. As a result, once the
order was issued, the Harper Companies had an
additional thirty days to file, and they did so.
[3] We now turn to the Harper Companies' argument
that the Commission wrongly assessed a sales tax on
transactions that were reflected in the accounting
records but did not have any legal reality. The Harper
Companies argue that the underlying facts of
ownership should govern, not the manner in which the
transactions were accounted for, at least when, as here,
the accounting was a result of an indisputably good
faith error by the accountant. We agree. As the United
States Supreme Court has observed, accounting records
"are no more than evidential, being neither
indispensable nor conclusive. The decision must rest
upon the actual facts." Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co.,
247 U.S. 179, 187, 38 S.Ct. 467, 470, 62 L.Ed. 1054
(1918). In apparent recognition of this principle, even
the Commission's final decision found that the sand and
gravel sales contracts had been "mistakenly assigned"
to Harper Sand and Gravel. Therefore, there is no
dispute on the record that the accounting records were
prepared in good faith but reflected a transaction that
did not exist. We therefore hold that the Commission
cannot assess a sales tax on those nonexistent
transactions.
Reversed.

This issue was specifically addressed in 49th Street
Galleria, 860 P.2d at 998-99. There, the court of
appeals held that a petition for judicial review was
timely filed because the agency involved had issued an
order denying reconsideration after the twenty-day
"deemed denied" period. Id. at 999. The court noted
that section 63-46b-14(3)(a) allows a party to file a
petition for judicial *816 review within thirty days
after the date on which an order was issued or was
considered to have been issued. Id. The court found
that if an agency chooses to issue an order denying a
petition for reconsideration after the twenty-day
presumptive denial period, the actual date of issuance
would mark the beginning of the thirty-day time period.
Id.
We agree with the court of appeals' interpretation of
section 63-46b-14(3)(a). When the Harper Companies
chose not to file their petition for review within the
twenty-day period, they assumed the risk that there
would be no order from the Commission. They would
have missed the deadline if the Commission had never
issued its final decision of June 3, 1992. However,

STEWART, Associate C.J., and DURHAM, J., and
RUSSELL W. BENCH, Court of Appeals Judge,
concur.
HALL, J., does not participate herein;
Court of Appeals Judge, sat.

BENCH,

HOWE, Justice, dissenting:
I dissent. The majority has misinterpreted the
legislative intent as to the deadline for filing a petition
for judicial review of the Tax Commission's final
action.
Section 63-46b-13 provides that any party may timely
request reconsideration of an agency's order. I agree
with the majority that Harper did that here. If
reconsideration is not granted, the party may seek
judicial review.
In order to move along the
reconsideration process, the legislature provided in
section 63-46b-13(3)(b) that "if the agency head or the
person designated for that purpose does not issue an
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order within twenty days after the filing of the request,
the request for reconsideration shall be considered to
be denied." Thus, if no agency action has been taken
on the request for reconsideration within twenty days,
the statute automatically makes the request denied.
The next step for an aggrieved party would be to file
a petition for judicial review of the agency action.
Section 63-46b-14(3)(a) provides that this filing must
be done "within thirty days after the date that the order
constituting the final agency action is issued or is
considered to have been issued under Subsection
63-46b-13(3)(b)."
The majority misconstrues the
intent of this statute. It erroneously interprets the
statute as starting the thirty days' appeal time to run
from either the date on which the agency denies the
request for reconsideration or the date on which it is
considered denied under subsection 63-46b-13(3)(b),
whichever is later. This interpretation makes no sense
and defeats the legislative intent of expediting the
administrative process. The reasonable interpretation
is that the thirty days for filing a petition for judicial
review begin to run when the agency denies the request
for reconsideration, *817. but if the agency has not
done so within twenty days, the request is considered
denied at that time and the appeal time starts running.
The majority's interpretation produces the anomalous
result that when an agency does not act on a request for
reconsideration within twenty days, it is considered to
be denied, but at any time thereafter (and apparently
without any outside limit) the agency may act on the
request, thereby breathing life into the case, and start
running again the thirty days to seek judicial review. I
submit that this interpretation is without parallel
anywhere in our statutes or rules of practice in any
other context. The majority cites no authority for its
interpretation. On the other hand, the Supreme Court
of Iowa in Ford Motor Co. v. Iowa Department of
Transportation Regulations Board, 282 N.W.2d 701
(Iowa 1979), was presented with the identical question.
There, the Administrative Procedure Act provided that
an application for rehearing shall be "deemed to have
been denied" unless the agency grants the application
within twenty days after its filing. Id. at 702-03. A
further rule provided that a petition for judicial review
must be filed within thirty days after the application for
rehearing has been denied or deemed denied. The
court held that the agency must act on the application
for rehearing, if at all, within twenty days. If it has not
done so, the application for rehearing is deemed denied
and the appeal time starts to run and cannot be
restarted by a subsequent denial of the application by
the agency. In its opinion, the court wrote:
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Parties to the proceedings have a need for and a right
to a prompt disposition of a dispute. We are
confident that the legislature was fully aware that
administrative agencies might meet irregularly.
Hence, in the interest of a prompt disposition of
disputes, the legislature superimposed an automatic
denial of any application not ruled upon within the
prescribed period.
Regrettable hardships may well result to litigants
who are unaware of the "deemed denied" provisions
of the statute. But it is in the overall interest of
litigants and the public at large that administrative
proceedings move to a prompt conclusion. The
legislature obviously had the broader public interest
in mind in adopting the statute.
Id. at 703. The same result was reached in Davis v.
Alabama Medicaid Agency, 519 So.2d 538
(Ala.Civ.App.1987). There, a statute provided that an
aggrieved party may file an application for rehearing
with an agency within fifteen days after entry of its
order. It was further provided that if the agency enters
no order regarding the application within thirty days,
the application shall be deemed denied. A petition for
judicial review was required to be filed within thirty
days after the decision on the request for rehearing is
rendered. The court held that once the thirty days had
run from the filing of the application for rehearing, the
time to appeal began to run and could not be altered or
extended by the agency's subsequent denial of the
application for rehearing. Id. at 539.
The majority creates a dilemma for an aggrieved
party who desires to seek judicial review. If the party
has requested reconsideration by the administrative
agency but no action has been taken on the request by
the end of twenty days, an appeal must then be filed.
If, however, the agency later (and there is no limitation
as to how much later) acts on the request and denies it,
the appeal which has been taken turns out to be
premature and must be dismissed. The party must then
file a second appeal, supposedly pay another filing fee,
and continue pursuit of the appeal. In no other context
in our appellate system do we tolerate such uncertainty
as to when an order is final and appealable and subject
a party seeking review to such a duplicative and
hazardous procedure.
I would dismiss the appeal as having been filed
untimely.
(FN1.) Harper Investments later changed its name to
Harper Excavating.
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*944 860P.2d944
Court of Appeals of Utah.
MAVERIK COUNTRY STORES, INC., Petitioner,
v.
The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH and
Vicky Ann McCord, Respondents.
Nos. 920206-CA, 910413-CA.
Sept. 7, 1993.
Employer petitioned for review of decisions of the
Industrial Commission in an antidiscrimination
hearing. The Court of Appeals, Billings, P.J., held
that: (1) the employer's failure to petition the Industrial
Commission for review of ALJ's decision barred
judicial review; (2) the initial petition for judicial
review did not divest the Commission of continuing
jurisdiction over the case; (3) the employer's petitions
for administrative review were not timely; and (4) the
employer failed to show good cause needed to obtain
extensions of the time for seeking administrative
review.
Appeal dismissed in part;
remanded.

affirmed in part;

and
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Before BILLINGS, JACKSON and RUSSON, JJ.
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge:
AMENDED OPINION (FN1)
Maverik Country Stores brings separate appeals from
two decisions of the Industrial Commission of Utah.
The first appeal is from the Industrial Commission's
determination that Maverik violated Utah Code Ann. §
§ 34-35-1 to -8 (1988 & Supp.1993), the Utah AntiDiscrimination Act, in its treatment of Vicky Ann
McCord. The second appeal is from the Industrial
Commission's ruling that Maverik's request for agency
review was untimely. We dismiss the first appeal and
affirm the ruling in the second. We remand for
assessment of attorney fees.
FACTS
Ms. Jones, a Maverik store manager, hired Ms.
McCord as a convenience store clerk on September 30,
1988. (FN2) McCord worked six hour shifts, four
days a week at $3.35 per hour during her two weeks of
part-time employment. While at work on October 14,
1988, McCord experienced tightness in her chest and
asked Jones if she could go to the hospital. The doctor
at the hospital indicated McCord's heart was fine.
McCord subsequently called Jones and offered to
finish her shift. Jones told her to stay home and rest.
While talking to McCord later that day, Jones stated
her mother had died from heart problems and her son
had recently had open heart surgery. She expressed
concern over the seriousness of McCord's heart
problems and indicated she would be afraid to leave
McCord in the store alone. Jones then terminated
McCord's employment.
McCord had answered "no" to an inquiry on the
employment application regarding whether she had any
heart problems which would limit her ability to
perform the job. She did have a condition known as
mitral
*946
valve prolapse which the parties
stipulated was a "usually benign condition." A doctor
examined McCord after she was terminated and found
employment posed no risk to her.
Jones subsequently filled out a company form, a
Record of Employee Counseling, describing the event
and indicating she was very concerned McCord's heart
problem would reoccur if she continued her job with
Maverik.
In a later letter to the Utah AntiDiscrimination Division (UADD), Jones again focused
on her concern about a stress related reoccurrence. At
the hearing before the administrative law judge (ALJ)
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on the discrimination claim, Jones mentioned some
additional factors for the termination. These were
McCord's difficulty in reading the gas pump meters and
allegations that McCord smelled of alcohol at work.
These factors, however, were never discussed in the
termination interview nor noted on the termination
form.
McCord subsequently sought employment at
numerous locations from 1989 to 1991. She worked
for a short time as a janitor at an elementary school but
was forced to quit due to an unrelated illness.
McCord filed a complaint alleging a violation of the
Utah Anti-Discrimination Act with the UADD on
October 24, 1988. The UADD found for McCord in
an Order issued January 24, 1991. Maverik requested
a formal hearing before an ALJ. The hearing was held
on May 15, 1991. The ALJ issued findings of fact and
conclusions of law on June 26, 1991. The ALJ's June
26, 1991 decision included a specific reservation of the
issue of appropriate attorney fees. On September 10,
1991, the ALJ issued a Supplemental Order disposing
of the issue of attorney fees.
On July 26, 1991, Maverik filed a Writ of Review
with this court (first appeal). The first appeal is from
the ALJ's Order of June 26, 1991. On August 26,
1991, McCord and the Industrial Commission filed
motions to dismiss the first appeal based on Maverik's
failure to exhaust administrative remedies and lack of a
final order. On September 16, 1991, this court ordered
those motions deferred, and requested the parties
include arguments on those issues in their briefs on the
merits.
Despite its pending appeal, M'averik then filed a
Request for Review by the Industrial Commission of
the ALJ's June 26, 1991 and September 10, 1991
Orders. The date the request was filed is unclear.
Counsel for Maverik signed and dated the request
October 10, 1991. The request has two received dates
stamped on it, October 11, 1991 and October 15, 1991.
In later orders referring to the request, the Industrial
Commission refers to both dates as the day it received
the request. For the purposes of our review, we assume
the request was received October 11, 1991.
On February 28, 1992, the Industrial Commission
denied Maverik's Request for Review based on its
untimeliness. (FN3) On March 19, 1992, Maverik
filed a request with the Industrial Commission to
reconsider its denial of the Request for Review. On
March 30, 1992, the Industrial Commission denied
Maverik's Request for Reconsideration. In this denial,
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the Industrial Commission recognized it could have
allowed the late Request for Review if Maverik had
shown good cause for extension of the time period.
The Industrial Commission ruled, however, that
Maverik had failed to show good cause for the
extension.
On April 3, 1992, Maverik filed a "Limited Request
for Reconsideration" in which it finally attempted to
show good cause for its late filing of the original
Request for Review. The Industrial Commission did
not respond to this unique motion. On April 7, 1992,
Maverik filed a Writ of Review with this court (second
appeal). The second appeal is from the Industrial
Commission's Order Denying Review and Order
Denying Request For Reconsideration.
*947 I. THE FIRST APPEAL-EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
[1] As a threshold matter, we must determine whether
we have jurisdiction over the first appeal. Regardless
of who raises the issue, we must dismiss a case if we
determine we do not have jurisdiction. Silva v.
Department of Employment Sec, 786 P.2d 246, 247
(Utah App. 1990) (per curiam); see also Thompson v.
Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah App.1987) (per
curiam).
"When a matter is outside the court's
jurisdiction it retains only the authority to dismiss the
action." Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreawc, 767 P.2d
569, 570 (Utah App. 1989).
[2] [3] The basic purpose underlying the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies "is to allow an
administrative agency to perform functions within its
special competence~to make a factual record, to apply
its expertise, and to correct its own errors so as to moot
judicial controversies." Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S.
34, 37, 92 S.Ct. 815, 818, 31 L.Ed.2d 17 (1972); see
also Pacific Intermountain Express Co. v. Tax
Comm'n, 316 P.2d 549, 551 (Utah 1957) (recognizing
correction rationale). Exceptions to the doctrine exist.
For example, in instances where there is a chance that
irreparable injury would occur if exhaustion was
required or where requiring exhaustion would serve no
useful purpose, the doctrine will not be applied. See
Tax Comm'n v. Iverson, 782 P.2d 519, 524 (Utah
1989); see also Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(2)(a) &
(b)(1989).
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review of the order ... in accordance with Section
63-46b-12." Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(1 l)(a)
(Supp.1993).
This allows parties to an antidiscrimination hearing to take advantage of the general
UAPA agency review process. If no timely review is
filed "the order by the presiding officer becomes the
final order of the commission." Id. § 34-35-7.1(1 l)(b).
This section provides that the Industrial Commission
need not act on the ALJ's order in any way for that
order to take effect. Thus, on the day Maverik filed its
petition for review the ALJ's order was a final
enforceable order of the Industrial Commission.
[4] The next subsection of the Anti-Discrimination
Act, however, requires an aggrieved party to file for
agency review under subsection 11(a) or lose the
opportunity for judicial review.
(FN4)
That
subsection provides: "An order of the commission
under Subsection (ll)(a) is subject to judicial review
as provided in Section 63-46b-16."
Id. §
34-35-7.1(12) (emphasis added). Subsection 12 could
have easily provided that a final order underSubsection
11 was subject to judicial review under UAPA. The
clear import of the legislature's omission of orders final
under subsection 11(b) is that they are not subject to
judicial review. Subsection 12 simply embodies the
general principle that a party must exhaust its
administrative remedies prior to obtaining judicial
review. Therefore, a party adversely affected by an
order of an ALJ in an anti-discrimination hearing
cannot obtain judicial review of that order until it has
been subject to administrative review. Cf. Hi-Country
Homeowners Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 779 P.2d
682 (Utah 1989) (holding Utah Code Ann. §
54-7-15(2)(b) required application for rehearing prior
to judicial appeal).
Furthermore, the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is apparently embodied in the
general provisions of UAPA. One section provides:
"A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting
all administrative remedies available...." Utah Code
Ann. § 63-46b-14(2) (1989) (emphasis added). This
provides additional *948 support for our decision.
(FN5) We have no jurisdiction over the first appeal
and have no choice but to dismiss it. (FN6)
II. THE SECOND APPEAL
A. Industrial Commission's Jurisdiction

In this case, Maverik appealed directly to this court
thirty days after the ALJ's ruling. The Utah AntiDiscrimination Act provides that following the
issuance of an order after a formal hearing pursuant to
the Act "either party may file a written request for

[5] Maverik contends the filing of the first appeal,
regardless of its timeliness, divested the Industrial
Commission of jurisdiction to continue to act in the
case. Thus, according to Maverik, every action taken
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by the Industrial Commission after the ALJ's June 26
Order is a nullity. Maverik would have us remand to
the Industrial Commission for entry of the
Supplemental Order on attorney fees and the agency
appeals process. Maverik does not provide any
relevant authority supporting this contention.
Other courts have consistently recognized an appeal
from a non-final order does not divest the
administrative tribunal of jurisdiction. For example, in
Fiebig v. Wheat Ridge Regional Center, 782 P.2d 814
(Colo.App.),c6?Y. denied, (Colo. Oct. 2, 1989), the
court held an untimely petition for judicial review did
not divest the agency of jurisdiction to act. Id. at 816.
In Fiebig, an employee appealed his termination to the
State Personnel Board.
The Board referred the
complaint to a hearing officer who ruled the allegations
of sexual misconduct against the employee were
without merit. The hearing officer, however, upheld
the termination on the grounds the employee could no
longer perform his job due to the allegations. Both
parties appealed the decision to the Board. The Board
ruled the hearing officer's findings were insufficient
and remanded the case to the officer for a new hearing.
The employer appealed the Board's ruling to the court
of appeals. Subsequently, the hearing the Board
ordered was held and the hearing officer ruled in favor
of the employee. The employer filed a motion with the
Board to declare the hearing officer's order invalid on
the grounds the appeal to the court eliminated the
agency's jurisdiction. The Board denied the motion.
The court of appeals upheld the Board's ruling because
"an appeal to a court without jurisdiction does not
divest the agency of jurisdiction to proceed with the
action on the merits." Id. at 816. Accord Northwest
Central Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 241
Kan. 165, 735 P.2d 241 (1987).
Similarly, we have recognized a notice of appeal filed
while a trial court is considering a proper postjudgment motion does not confer jurisdiction on this
court. DeBry v. Fidelity Nat. Title Ins. Co., 828 P.2d
520, 523 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948
(Utah May 14, 1993). We reasoned "to permit an
appeal would be an affront to judicial economy"
because allowing the trial *949 court to dispose of the
motion might eliminate needless appeals and
discourage pointless delay. Id. See also Williams v.
City of Valdez, 603 P.2d 483, 488 (Alaska 1979)
(holding appeal brought from non-final order of a trial
court does not divest court of jurisdiction); Knox v.
Dick, 99 Nev. 514, 665 P.2d 267, 269 (Nev.1983)
(holding "appeal from a non-appealable order does not
divest the trial court of jurisdiction"). Likewise here,
allowing an untimely appeal to divest the agency of
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jurisdiction creates the possibility of multiple appeals
and needless delays.
Under the rule for which Maverik argues, a party who
prematurely appeals an agency decision could unjustly
delay further agency action. The rationale behind
allowing continuing jurisdiction in the agency
following an appeal from a non-final order applies with
equal force to allow continuing jurisdiction where the
action is subject to further administrative review. We
thus follow our sister jurisdictions and conclude
appeals from agency orders subject to further
administrative review do not divest the agency of
jurisdiction. Therefore, the Industrial Commission had
jurisdiction to act after the first appeal was filed.
B. Timeliness
McCord and the Industrial Commission argue we
should dismiss the second appeal because Maverik's
Request for Review of the Final Order of the ALJ was
untimely. Maverik responds its request was timely
because either (1) Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 6(e)
gives it three extra days to file the appeal, (2) the filing
date is the date of mailing or, (3) the Industrial
Commission abused its discretion in failing to extend
the filing deadline by one day. The Final Order was
issued September 10, 1991 and Maverik filed its
Request for Review October 11, 1991. Whether URCP
6(e) is applicable or whether the crucial date is the
mailing date are questions that involve the agency's
application or interpretation of general law which we
review under section 63-46b-16(4)(d) for correction of
error. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div., 814 P.2d
581, 587-89 (Utah 1991); King v. Industrial Comm'n,
850 P.2d 1281, 1285-86 (Utah App.1993). See also
SEMECO v. Auditing Div., 849 P.2d 1167, 1172 (Utah
1993) (Durham, J., dissenting).
1. Date of Filing
[6] UAPA provides a request for review must be filed
"within 30 days after the issuance of the order...." Utah
Code Ann. § 63-46b-12(l)(a) (1989). The request
must also "be sent by mail to the presiding officer and
to each party." Id. § 63-46b-12(l)(b)(iv). The parties
agree the order was dated and issued September 10,
1991. See Dusty's Inc. v. Auditing Div., 842 P.2d 868,
870 (Utah 1992) (holding administrative order is
issued on date on face of order).
Maverik first argues that Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 6(e) gives it a three day extension on the
thirty day filing deadline.
That rule provides:
"Whenever a party ... is required to do some act ...
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within a prescribed period after the service of a notice
... upon him and the notice ... is served by mail, 3 days
shall be added to the prescribed period."
Utah
R.Civ.P. 6(e) (emphasis added). That rule must be
read in light of section 63-46b-12(l)(a) of UAPA
which requires a party to appeal thirty days after the
issuance of the administrative ruling. Thus, Rule 6(e)
does not apply because under section 63-46b-12(l)(a)
of UAPA the time for appeal runs from the issuance of
an order not from the service of an order on a party.
2. Filing Requirement
[7] Maverik next argues Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
5 (FN7) somehow supports its contention the date of
mailing is the relevant date. Rule 5(d) explicitly
recognizes a distinction between the filing of
documents and the service of documents on a party.
See Utah R.Civ.P. 5(d). (FN8) All the language *950
of Rule 5 relied on by Maverik relates to service on a
party not to the filing of documents necessary to start
an appeal and is, thus, inapposite. Likewise, Maverik's
attempted reliance on the language of section
63-46b-12(l)(b)(iv) is unpersuasive. The requirement
that requests for review be sent to the presiding officer
and the opposing party is a requirement of service, not
of filing.
Further, it is clear that under the procedural rules
which govern our courts, filing requires actual delivery
to the court. For example, in Silva v. Department of
Employment Sec, 786 P.2d 246 (Utah App. 1990) (per
curiam), we dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction, a claim
of a petitioner whose petition for review to this court
arrived one day late in the mail. The petition had been
mailed two days prior to the day the petition was due.
We noted: "The argument that an appeal is filed when
mailed has been consistently rejected in the past and
we reject it here." Id. at 247 (citing Isaacson v.
Dorius, 669 P.2d 849 (Utah 1983); State v. Palmer,
111 P.2d 521 (Utah App. 1989)). In Isaacson, the
supreme court noted that interpreting filing as mailing
could lead to chaos in appellate procedure. Isaacson,
669P.2dat851.
Maverik provides no reason why we should interpret
the term filing as used in UAPA inconsistently with
how we interpret it under the procedural rules used in
courts. Thus, absent a showing of good cause for an
extension, the term filing as used in section 63-46b-12
requires, as a prerequisite to the agency taking
jurisdiction over a review, actual delivery of the
necessary documents to the agency within the thirty
day time limit.
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3. Extension of Filing Deadline
Maverik next argues the Industrial Commission
abused its discretion by failing to grant a one day
extension of the filing deadline. Maverik does not
identify the portion of 63-46b-16(4) under which it
asks us to review this claim. See King v. Industrial
Comm'n, 850 P.2d 1281, 1286 n. 6 (Utah App.1993)
(encouraging counsel to clearly identify the portion of
63-46b-16(4) under which review is sought). Because
the authority to grant an extension in a filing deadline
is not in an agency-specific statute, but rather a general
provision of UAPA, and because Maverik is arguing an
abuse of discretion standard, it appears Maverik is
necessarily seeking review under Utah Code Ann. §
63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv) (1988). That catch-all portion of
section 63-46b-16(4) provides we can grant relief if the
agency action is "arbitrary or capricious." Id. We
review agency action under this section for
reasonableness. Anderson v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
839 P.2d 822, 824 (Utah 1992). See also SEMECO v.
Auditing Div., 849 P.2d 1167, 1174 (Utah 1993)
(Durham, J., dissenting).
a. The Original Request for Reconsideration
[8] For an agency to extend any deadline established
under UAPA the petitioner must show good cause. See
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(9) (1988). In its Request
for Reconsideration, Maverik made no attempt to show
good cause. The Industrial Commission, in its Order
denying the Request for Reconsideration, specifically
notes Maverik's failure to show good cause. Thus, the
Industrial Commission's decision denying Maverik a
one day extension is not unreasonable in light of
Maverik's complete failure to articulate any facts on
which to base a good cause determination.
b. The Second Request for Reconsideration
[9] In a document captioned "Limited Request for
Reconsideration" filed April 3, 1992, six days after the
original Request for Reconsideration was denied and
four days before the second appeal was filed, *951
Maverik finally attempts to show good cause. There is
no authorization for a "Limited Request for
Reconsideration" in UAPA.
Counsel's failure to
comply with the rules which set forth the requirements
for getting an extension of the filing deadline does not
give him the right to create another layer of
administrative appeal. (FN9) No section of UAPA
provides a petitioner with the right to file more than
one request for reconsideration. (FN 10) Endorsing
such a procedure would allow mischievous counsel to
use the right to reconsideration as a tool for needless,
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and in some cases, harmful delay. Thus, this filing was
appropriately
disregarded
by
the
Industrial
Commission. (FN11)
ATTORNEY FEES
[10] Because we reject both appeals, we necessarily
affirm the award of costs and attorney fees and the
award of damages *952. authorized by the ALJ. The
ALJ awarded legal costs of $1536.26 to McCord. She
awarded $19,731 in legal fees to McCord. She also
awarded $11,832.80 in back pay to McCord. (FN12)
These awards are authorized by Utah Code Ann. §
34-35-7.1(9) (1988). We also award McCord attorney
fees on appeal under the same statute. Thus, we
remand the case to the Industrial Commission for the
sole purpose of assessing the appropriate amount of
attorney fees for this appeal.
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(FN5.) Because we find the Anti-Discrimination Act
required Maverik to petition for review by the
Industrial Commission, we do not directly address,
but merely acknowledge, some conflict between our
decision and Heinecke v. Department of Commerce,
810 P.2d 459 (Utah App. 1991). Although the
Industrial Commission asks us to revisit that decision,
we find it unnecessary at this time. In Heinecke, we
focused on the language of Utah Code Ann. §
63-46b-12(l)(a) (1989) and held a petitioner need not
avail himself of a review permitted by agency rule
prior to filing an appeal to this court.
We
distinguished such permissive review from review
which is statutorily mandated. Id. at 462. See also
Hi-Country Homeowners Assoc, v. Public Service
Comm'n, 779 P.2d 682, 684 (Utah 1989) (holding
review pursuant Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-15(2)(b)
must be exhausted prior to judicial appeal).

CONCLUSION
Maverik brought the first appeal prior to exhausting
the available administrative remedies.
Maverik
brought the second appeal from a reasonable ruling of
the Industrial Commission that Maverik's Request for
Review was untimely. Thus, we dismiss case number
910413-CA and affirm the Order of the Industrial
Commission in case number 920206-CA. We remand
the case to the Industrial Commission for the sole
purpose of assessing attorney fees on appeal.
JACKSON and RUSSON, JJ., concur.
(FN1.) This opinion replaces the earlier opinion in
cases No. 920206-CA and No. 910413-CA, issued
June 3, 1993, pursuant to cross-petitions for rehearing
granted August 28, 1993.
(FN2.) Because Appellant does not challenge the
factual findings of the Industrial Commission, we
recite the facts in accord with those findings. See
King v. Industrial Comm'n, 850 P.2d 1281, 1285
(Utah App. 1993).
(FN3.) In the Order denying the Request for Review,
the Industrial Commission also addressed and
rejected Maverik's claims on the merits. Because of
our ultimate conclusion, we need not and do not
comment on the propriety of the Industrial
Commission's disposition on the merits.
(FN4.) We note our concern that despite the inordinate
amount of briefing and conflict in this case, no party
to either of these appeals directed us to the
determinative statute.

In Heinecke, however, we did not address the impact
of Utah Code Ann.§ 63-46b-14(2) (1989) which
provides: "A party may seek judicial reviewcw/y
after exhausting all administrative remedies
available...." Id. See also Tax Comm'n v. Iverson,
782 P.2d 519, 524 n. 3 (Utah 1989) (citing section
63-46b-14 for proposition petitioner must exhaust
administrative remedies prior to judicial review).
According to the Industrial Commission section
63-46b-14(2) requires a party to utilize every
possible agency review prior to filing an
administrative appeal.
We note Heinecke was
rendered without the benefit of briefing by counsel.
Heinecke, 810 P.2d at 462. Further, we specifically
recognized we might revisit Heinecke at an
appropriate point in the future. Id. at 464 n. 6. That
day still awaits.
(FN6.) Regardless of the premature nature of its
appeal, Maverik asks us to apply Utah Rule of
Appellate Procedure 4(c) and find the appeal
procedurally proper. Maverik fails to note, however,
that Rule 4(c) does not apply to petitions for review
of administrative actions. See Utah R.App.P. 18.
(FN7.) Rule 5 relates to the service and filing of
papers. See Utah R.Civ.P. 5.
(FN8.) That section provides:
All papers after the complaint required to be served
upon a party shall btfiled with the court either before
service or within a reasonable time thereafter, but the
court may upon motion of a party or on its own
initiative order that depositions, interrogatories,
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requests for documents, requests for admissions and
answers and responses thereto not be filed unless on
order of the court or for use in the proceeding.
Utah R.Civ.P. 5(d) (emphasis added).
*952_ (FN9.) As our supreme court has noted in a
different setting, if we allow a second motion for
reconsideration or "re-reconsideration" what is to
prevent another motion for re-re-reconsideration? "
Tenacious litigants and lawyers might persist in
motions, arguments and pressures and theoretically
[this could go on] ad infinitum' " Watkiss &
Campbell v. FOA & Sons, 808 P.2d 1061, 1064
(Utah 1991) (quoting Drury v. Lanceford, 18 Utah 2d
74, 415 P.2d 662, 663 (1966)) (alteration added).
(FN 10.) Likewise, under the administrative law
scheme in place prior to UAPA we noted that a
petitioner could not file successive motions for
review. See Ring v. Industrial Comm'n, 744 P.2d
602, 603 (Utah App. 1987) (per curiam). Under that
scheme filing material which purports to supplement
an already denied motion did not revive the motion.
Id. As we explicitly noted in Ring, a petitioner is
only "entitled to 'one bite of the apple' on review
before the Industrial Commission." Id. at 604.
Under UAPA, the same reasoning applies to requests
for reconsideration, a petitioner has only one
opportunity to apply for reconsideration. See also
Utility Trailer Sales of Salt Lake, Inc. v. Fake, 740
P.2d 1327, 1329 (Utah 1987) (recognizing rule
against repetitive adjudications in arbitration setting);
Tuom v. Duane Hall Trucking, 675 P.2d 1200, 1202
(Utah 1984) (recognizing rule against repetitive
challenges to Industrial Commission determinations
of spousal dependency); Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 969 (Utah App. 1989)
(recognizing rule against successive post-judgment
motions).
(FN11.) Even if we were to treat the second Request
for Reconsideration as procedurally proper, we would
dismiss the second appeal. The request would
reinvoke the jurisdiction of the Industrial
Commission. Under UAPA, because the Industrial
Commission did not respond to the request it would
be deemed denied April 23, 1992 by operation of
law. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13(3)(b) (1989);
Lopez v. Career Serv. Review Bd., 834 P.2d 568, 572
(Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah
1992). Therefore no "final agency action" for this
court to review existed until after April 23, 1992.
UAPA provides:
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Within 20 days after the date that an order is issued
for which review by the agency or by a superior
agency under Section 63-46b-12 is unavailable, and if
the order would otherwise constitute final agency
action, any party may file a written request for
reconsideration with the agency.... Utah Code Ann. §
63-46b-13(l)(a) (1989) (emphasis added).
This section provides a petitioner with the option of
applying to the agency for reconsideration or
appealing to the courts. It does not provide a
petitioner the opportunity to pursue both routes
concurrently. The emphasized language indicates a
petitioner who decides to file a request for
reconsideration no longer has a "final agency action"
from which to appeal. The petitioner must wait until
the request is either responded to in writing or denied
by operation of law.
Section 63-46b-13(l)(a)
provides a request for reconsideration is not a
mandatory step in exhausting administrative remedies
or reaching "finality" to give the courts jurisdiction
over an appeal.
Under UAPA, a request for
reconsideration asks the highest level of
administrative decision maker to reassess a claim
they have previously examined. A request for
review, on the other hand, asks a higher level
decision maker to evaluate the claim. Compare Utah
Code Ann. § 63-46b-12 (1989) (agency review
procedures)with id.
§ 63-46b-13 (requests for
reconsideration). Petitioners who choose to take
advantage of the statutory provision that allows them
to request reconsideration must thereafter accept the
consequences, one of which is that an appeal to the
judicial system cannot be made until the agency acts
on the request.
Thus, the second request for reconsideration would
have given the Industrial Commission another
opportunity to address the merits. Therefore, as of
April 7, 1992, Maverik would have no final order
from which to appeal. Under this analysis, the
second appeal would be brought from a non-final
order over which we have no jurisdiction and we
would dismiss it.
Further, the window for Maverik to file an appeal
from the Industrial Commission's denial of the second
request would have been from April 23, 1992 to May
23, 1992. Thus, regardless of the analysis we apply,
Maverik is left without judicial review of the merits.
*952_ (FN 12.) Counsel for Maverik has consistently
complained no actual damages amount was set in the
ALJ's order. He apparently is unwilling to do the
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math using the formula established in the ALJ's
original order. To eliminate any confusion and
reduce future conflict in this unnecessarily
contentious litigation, we set forth the back pay
calculation using the formula established in the ALJ's
original order.
Oct 15, 1988 to March 31, 1990
$3.35 per hr for 24 hrs a week
$80.40
per
week
for
6,110.40
April 1, 1990 to March 31, 1991
$3.80 per hr for 24 hrs a week
$91.20
per
week
for

76

weeks

52

weeks
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4,742.40
April 1, 1991 to June 26, 1991
$4.25 per hr for 24 hrs a week
$102.00
per
week
for
1,275.00
Subtotal
Minus
earnings
295.00
Back
Pay
$11,832.80

at
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award

12.5

weeks

12,127.80
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*1284 803 P.2d 1284
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Kenneth L. VIRGIN, Petitioner,
v.
BOARD OF REVIEW OF the INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION OF UTAH,
Stateline Chevron, Workers* Compensation Fund,
and
Employers' Reinsurance Fund, Respondents.
No. 900167-CA.
Dec. 18, 1990.
Claimant sought review of Industrial Commission's
order denying his claim for workers' compensation
benefits for hip replacement surgery. The Court of
Appeals, Billings, J., held that substantial evidence
supported finding that claimant's disability and surgery
were caused solely by preexisting hip disease.
Affirmed.
Bench, J., concurred in the result.
West Headnotes
[1] Administrative Law and Procedure <®=>791
15A—15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
15AV(E) Particular Questions, Review of
15Ak784 Fact Questions
15Ak791 Substantial Evidence.
[See headnote text below]
[ 1 ] Workers' Compensation <S=> 1939.4(4)
413 —
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(T) Review by Court
413XVI(T)12A Questions of Law or Fact,
Findings, and Verdict
413kl939 Review of Decision of Department,
Commission,
Board,
Officer,
or
Arbitrator
413kl939.4 Sufficiency of Evidence in Support
413kl939.4(4) Substantial Evidence.
Standard of review of Industrial Commission's
decision on workers' compensation claim is whether
findings are supported by substantial evidence on
record as whole. U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-l to 63-46b-22.
[2] Workers' Compensation <@^=>552
413 —
413VIII Injuries for Which Compensation May Be
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Had
413VIII(A) Nature and Character of Physical Harm
413VIII(A)4 Aggravation of Previously Impaired
Condition
413k552 In General.
Industrial injuries that aggravate or "light up"
preexisting conditions and are causally connected to
subsequent onset of symptoms of disease or condition
are compensable if subsequent disability is medical
result of exertion or injury that occurred during workrelated activity and is not solely result of preexisting
condition.
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-69;
U.C.A.1953,
35-1-69 (Repealed).
[3] Workers' Compensation <@=>552
413 —
413VIII Injuries for Which Compensation May Be
Had
413VIII(A) Nature and Character of Physical Harm
413VIII(A)4 Aggravation of Previously Impaired
Condition
413k552 In General.
Ratable permanent aggravation of preexisting
condition, rather than temporary aggravation or
nonratable acceleration of symptoms, must be present
to justify award of workers' compensation benefits if
industrial injury results in permanent impairment that
aggravates preexisting permanent impairment to any
degree. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-69; U.C.A.1953, 35-1-69
(Repealed).
[4] Workers' Compensation <®=>1542
413 —
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(N) Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence
413XVI(N)7 Accident or Injury and Consequences
Thereof
413kl542 Aggravation or Acceleration of Disease
or Impaired Condition in General.
Substantial evidence supported finding by Industrial
Commission that claimant's entire ratable impairment
from avascular necrosis of hip that required hip
replacement surgery preexisted industrial accident in
which auto body struck claimant's hip and that accident
did not contribute to the claimant's impairment and,
thus, that claimant was not entitled to disability
benefits; claimant's doctor testified that preexisting
disease was sole cause of claimant's disability and
subsequent hip replacement surgery and that while
perhaps surgery had happened sooner than it would
have without industrial accident, ultimately surgery
would have been necessary. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-69;
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-69 (Repealed).
*1285 LeRoy K. Johnson (argued), Salt Lake City,
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for petitioner.
Richard Sumsion, Mark Dean (argued), Salt Lake
City, for Workers' Comp. Fund of Utah.
Erie V. Boorman, Administrator (argued), Salt Lake
City, for Employers' Reinsurance Fund.
James E. Harward, Director, Salt Lake City, for Div.
of Legal Affairs, Industrial Com'n of Utah.
Before BENCH, BILLINGS and GREENWOOD, JJ.
OPINION
BILLINGS, Judge:
Kenneth L. Virgin ("Virgin") seeks review of the
Industrial Commission's ("Commission") order denying
his claim for workers' compensation benefits. The
Commission concluded there was not a causal
connection between Virgin's industrial injury and his
subsequent hip replacement surgery and thus denied
disability benefits. We affirm.
On June 15, 1986, Virgin was injured on the job
when an automobile engine on which he was working,
snapped a supporting chain and hit Virgin in the area of
his left hip and knocked him down. Virgin did not
seek medical attention until three days later when he
was examined by a physician's assistant who found
bruising and tenderness in the left hip area, but no
fractures.
Virgin reported the industrial accident
immediately, but made no claim for compensation at
that time and did not miss any work as a result of this
industrial accident.
Virgin claimed to have trouble with his left hip two to
three months after the accident. Virgin did not seek
further medical treatment, however, until nearly
fourteen months after the industrial accident, when he
was seen in the emergency room of a local hospital.
Virgin was then referred to an orthopedic surgeon who
examined him in September 1987. The orthopedic
surgeon concluded Virgin had severe aseptic necrosis
of the left hip and aseptic necrosis to a lesser degree of
the right hip "probably on the basis of alcoholism," and
recommended a total hip replacement when symptoms
warranted, but suggested Virgin wait as long as
possible.
*1286 In February 1988, Virgin was examined by
another orthopedic surgeon. Virgin had a left total hip
replacement on May 25, 1988 and returned to work on
June 15, 1988. He claimed he was entitled to medical
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expenses, temporary total disability and permanent
partial disability as a result of his surgery, claiming his
hip replacement surgery was caused in part by his 1986
industrial accident. Virgin requested a hearing to
review his entitlement to compensation. After the
initial hearing, the administrative law judge ("A.L.J.")
appointed a medical panel consisting of one orthopedic
surgeon, Dr. Craig McQueen. Dr. McQueen examined
Virgin and thereafter prepared and submitted the
following medical findings.
[T]he patient did suffer an injury to his hip during the
June 15, 1986 accident which aggravated his preexisting avascular necrosis. So I do not feel that his
May 25, 1988 surgery was necessitated by the
industrial accident. I think perhaps it happened
sooner than it would have had he not had an injury,
but I feel he would have ultimately had needed
surgery on this inspite of any industrial injury.... I do
not feel that the disability following his surgery was
due to the industrial accident
Since I do not feel
that he had an industrial injury that caused his hip
problems, I do not think he had any permanent
physical impairment directly caused by the industrial
accident. The percentage of permanent physical
impairment directly attributable to the pre-existing
conditions would be approximately a 40% permanent
partial impairment of the left hip. He would have the
same on the right hip, but these would be preexisting. I do agree that the industrial accident... did
aggravate his pre-existing condition, but was not
causally related to his avascular necrosis.
At a subsequent hearing, both parties examined Dr.
McQueen in an attempt to clarify whether Virgin's
earlier industrial accident was causally related to his
hip replacement surgery. Dr. McQueen maintained his
position that all of Virgin's ratable impairment was
caused by his pre-existing avascular necrosis. He did
testify that the industrial injury may have necessitated
surgery sooner, but he was unable to speculate as to
how much sooner.
At the hearing, the A.L.J,
questioned Dr. McQueen about the 40% permanent
partial impairment he had assigned to Virgin. The
A.L.J, asked whether it could be "reasonable to reach
the conclusion that of that 40%, 5% was caused by the
industrial contribution?" Dr. McQueen responded that
this "might be reasonable, because that's a small
amount of what his total disability is, because certainly,
in my initial opinion, the whole major cause for his
problem is the avascular necrosis and I think there is no
question about that.
I think there is a small
contribution from his industrial injury." In answer to a
subsequent question however, Dr. McQueen reiterated
his opinion that all of Virgin's ratable impairment was
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due to the pre-existing avascular necrosis.
Based on the testimony of the medical panel, the
A.L.J, found the industrial accident directly and
permanently aggravated Virgin's pre-existing avascular
necrosis and thus had a causal relationship to his hip
replacement, and awarded Virgin medical expenses
associated with the hip replacement and temporary
total and permanent partial workers' compensation
benefits.
The Commission reviewed the case, concluded
Virgin was not entitled to benefits and revoked the
A.L.J.'s order and findings. The Commission found:
The Medical Panel report dated January 29, 1989,
stated that while the industrial accident may have
aggravated Applicant's pre-existing asymptomatic
avascular necrosis, it was not causally related. It
further stated that no permanent physical impairment
was directly caused by the industrial accident and that
the period of disability following the surgery was not
due to the industrial accident....
Because the Commission finds that no industrial
benefits are due on account of *1287 Applicant's
injury, the Commission hereby adopts the report of
the Medical Panel that Applicant's entire ratable
impairment pre-existed the industrial accident of June
15, 1986, and that the accident did not contribute to
Applicant's impairment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] At the outset, it is important to note that the
Commission, not the A.L.J., is the ultimate finder of
fact. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 607 P.2d
807, 811 (Utah 1980); see Utah Code Ann. §
63-46b-12(6)(c) (1989). Medical causation, including
whether an industrial accident aggravated a preexisting condition, is a factual matter.
(FN1)
Proceedings in this case were commenced after January
1, 1988, thus the Utah Administrative Procedure Act
("UAPA") controls. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-l to
-22 (1989). This court clearly articulated the standard
for reviewing factual findings under the UAPA in
Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 116 P.2d 63
(Utah Ct.App.1989). "[I]t is clear that the Board's
findings of fact will be affirmed only if they are
'supported by substantial evidence when viewed in
light of the whole record before the court.'" Id. at 67.
"Substantial evidence is 'such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.' " Id.
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The party challenging the Commission's findings of
fact "must marshall all of the evidence supporting the
findings and show that despite the supporting facts, and
in light of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the
findings are not supported by substantial evidence."
Id. at 68. In Grace Drilling, this court also noted that
in applying the substantial evidence test when
reviewing findings of fact, the court should not
substitute its own judgment as between two reasonably
conflicting views, even though it may have come to a
different conclusion. "It is the province of the Board,
not appellate courts, to resolve conflicting evidence,
and where inconsistent inferences can be drawn from
the same evidence, it is for the Board to draw the
inferences." Id.
MEDICAL CAUSATION
The Commission concedes that Virgin suffered an
industrial accident when he was struck by the swinging
engine while at work. Thus, legal causation is not at
issue. (FN2) Rather, this case centers on whether
Virgin's industrial accident was the medical cause of
his hip replacement surgery and subsequent disability.
(FN3)
Virgin argues that because the medical panel stated
his 1986 industrial injuryaggravated his pre-existing
avascular necrosis and may have necessitated surgery
sooner, his hip replacement should be compensable,
regardless of the fact that the doctor was unable to
clearly assign any degree of permanent or temporary
impairment to his 1986 industrial accident. The
Commission contends there was no medical *1288
causation because the "aggravating" industrial injury
did not result in a medically measurable permanent
impairment. The Commission claims there can be no
liability where as a result of an industrial accident, a
worker suffers only temporary aggravation or pain or a
nonratable, speculative acceleration of symptoms of a
pre-existing condition.
Virgin has the burden to prove a causal connection
between his 1986 industrial injury and his subsequent
hip surgery and disability by a preponderance of the
evidence. See Ortiz v. Industrial Comm'n, 766 P.2d
1092, 1095 (Utah Ct.App.1989); Large v. Industrial
Comm'n, 758 P.2d 954, 956 (Utah Ct.App.1988)
(citing Allen v. Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah
1986)). If Virgin cannot demonstrate this link, he
cannot recover. Allen, 729 P.2d at 27.
[2] Generally, industrial injuries that aggravate or
"light up" pre-existing conditions and are causally
connected to the subsequent onset of symptoms of the
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disease or condition, are compensable. Id. at 25 (citing
Powers v. Industrial Comm'n, 19 Utah 2d 140, 143-44,
427 P.2d 740, 743 (Utah 1967)). However, a claimant
must prove the subsequent disability is "medically the
result of an exertion or injury that occurred during a
work-related activity," id. at 27, and not solely the
result of a pre-existing condition. (FN4)
Recently, this court addressed a similar pre-existing
condition-medical causation issue in Zimmerman v.
Industrial Comm'n, 785 P.2d 1127 (Utah Ct.App.1989)
. In Zimmerman, the applicant claimed an industrial
injury to his back aggravated his previously
asymptomatic Reiter's syndrome and spinal stenosis,
and thus he should have been granted benefits for the
pre-existing disease under Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-69,
(FN5) much as Virgin claims in this case. The medical
panel in *1289 Zimmerman stated: "The industrial
injury aggravated the pre-existing condition since we
are unable to find any evidence of pain before the
industrial injury." Zimmerman, 785 P.2d at 1129
(emphasis added).
Nevertheless, the medical panel concluded that all of
Zimmerman's residual back problems were caused by
his pre-existing conditions. Based upon the medical
evidence in Zimmerman, this court acknowledged that
compensation must be awarded "if the industrial injury
results in a permanent impairment that is aggravated by
or aggravates a pre-existing permanent impairment to
any degree." Id. at 1131 (quoting Second Injury Fund
v. Streator Chevrolet, 709 P.2d 1176, 1181 (Utah
1985)). However, we denied recovery in Zimmerman
because we found the medical panel report as a whole
indicated the "aggravation" referred to was due solely
to temporary pain. We stated: "No permanent
impairment was found to have resulted from the
industrial injury itself or in combination with the prior
existing conditions. Because the industrial accident did
not result in a permanent impairment, the Board
correctly denied benefits." Id.
[3] Virgin relies heavily on the "aggravation to any
degree" language in Zimmerman to support his claim
for benefits. However, this language does not refer to
temporary aggravation or nonratable acceleration of
symptoms, but to a ratable permanent aggravation of a
pre-existing condition. (FN6)
[4] In this case, the medical panel report indicated
that while the industrial injury "aggravated his preexisting avascular necrosis," Virgin's left hip surgery
and subsequent temporary and 40% permanent
disability were not caused by the industrial injury. In
its report, the medical panel speculated that perhaps
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the surgery happened sooner than it would have
without the industrial accident, but could not quantify
the time. The panel also speculated as a result of the
A.L.J.'s questions, that it "might be reasonable" to
assign 5% of Virgin's disability to his industrial
accident, but later the panel clearly rejected any
allocation to the industrial accident. The medical panel
stated that ultimately, Virgin would have needed the
surgery in any event.
Although Dr. McQueen's testimony is confusing at
times, ultimately, the doctor firmly states that the sole
cause of Virgin's disability and consequent surgery was
his pre-existing avascular necrosis.
The Commission entered specific findings regarding
medical causation stating that, "[B]ecause the
Commission finds that no industrial benefits are due on
account of Applicant's injury, the Commission hereby
adopts the report of the Medical Panel that Applicant's
entire ratable impairment pre-existed the industrial
accident of June 15, 1986, and that the accident did not
contribute to Applicant's impairment."
As we have previously recognized, the Commission
is the ultimate fact finder in workers' compensation
cases. As the fact finder, the Commission may choose
to give certain evidence more weight than other
evidence. See Mollerup Van Lines v. Adams, 16 Utah
2d 235, 398 P.2d 882 (1965). In Mollerup, the court
noted that "[i]t was both the duty and the prerogative of
the Commission to view [the doctor's] entire testimony
together and it could believe those statements which
impressed it as being true, even though there may have
been some seeming contradictions in other parts of his
testimony." 398 P.2d at 885 (citations omitted).
More recently, this court has held that the
Commission will not be reversed simply *1290.
because it has chosen to rely on one portion of a
medical panel report and to reject other inconsistent
portions. See USX Corp. v. Industrial Commission,
781 P.2d 883, 887 (Utah Ct.App.1989).
We conclude there is substantial evidence in the
medical panel report to support the Commission's
finding that "the applicant's entire ratable impairment
pre-existed the industrial accident of June 15, 1986,
and that the accident did not contribute to the
applicant's impairment."
Therefore, we affirm the
Commission's order denying Virgin benefits.
GREENWOOD, J., concurs.
BENCH, J., concurs in the result.
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(FN1.) See, e.g., Anderson v. Dominic Elec., 660 P.2d
241, 242 (Utah 1983) (whether industrial accident
aggravated pre-existing injury is factual matter best
left to Commission); Frenchik v. Industrial Comm'n,
22 Utah 2d 123, 449 P.2d 649, 650 (1969)
(Commission's factual findings that medical panel
unable to relate present difficulty to industrial injury
conclusive); Large v. Industrial Comm'n, 758 P.2d
954, 957 (Utah Ct.App.1988) (factual finding that
industrial injury was not medical cause of claimant's
permanent disability upheld).
(FN2.) In Allen v. Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15, 18
(Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court held that a
claimant must prove both "legal" and "medical"
causation in order to recover workers' compensation
benefits. "Under the legal test, the law must define
what kind of exertion satisfies the test of 'arising out
of the employment' ... [then] the doctors must say
whether the exertion (having been held legally
sufficient to support compensation) in fact caused this
[injury]." Id. at 25 (quoting Larson,Workmen's
Compensation § 38.83(a), at 7-276 to 277).
(FN3.) In this case, it is important to note that Virgin
did not claim any temporary disability immediately
following the accident, but instead made claims only
for the temporary and permanent disability associated
with the hip replacement.
(FN4.) Utah's appellate courts have denied benefits in
each of the following cases as the court found the
disability was solely the result of a pre-existing
condition. In Lancaster v. Gilbert Dev., 736 P.2d
237 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court upheld the
Commission's denial of benefits for aggravation of a
pre-existing condition where the medical evidence
was conflicting and inconclusive. The court in
Lancaster noted that "although the medical evidence
was conflicting, it is the responsibility of the
administrative law judge to resolve factual conflicts."
Id. at 241. In Olsen v. Industrial Comm'n, 116 P.2d
937, 939 (Utah Ct.App.1989) affd, 797 P.2d 1098
(Utah 1990), this court upheld denial of benefits
where the Commission discounted opinions of
claimant's experts and adopted the opinion of the
medical panel that disability was due entirely to a
pre-existing condition.
In Large v. Industrial
Comm'n, 758 P.2d 954 (Utah Ct.App.1988), this
court upheld the Commission's denial of benefits
where there was "substantial evidence in the record to
support a finding that the 1985 injury was not the
medical cause of [claimant's] permanent total
disability," as claimant's disability resulted from preexisting conditions. Id. at 957.
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(FN5.) Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-69(1) (1986), as in
effect at the time the events in this case occurred,
generally provides for apportionment of liability for
disability benefits where an industrial accident
aggravates a pre-existing disease. The statute sets out
a procedure for apportionment of compensation
between the employer or its insurance carrier and the
Second Injury Fund.
The statute specifically
provides:
(1) If any employee who has previously incurred a
permanent incapacity by incidental injury, disease, or
congenital causes, sustained an industrial injury for
which either compensation or medical care, or both,
is provided by this chapter that results in permanent
incapacity which is substantially greater than he
would have incurred if he had not had the preexisting incapacity, or which aggravates or is
aggravated by such pre-existing incapacity, as
outlined in Section 35-1-81, shall be awarded on the
basis of the combined injuries, but the liability of the
employer for such compensation, medical care, and
other related items shall be for the industrial injury
only. The remainder shall be paid out of the Second
Injury Fund....
In 1988, section 35-1-69 was repealed and a new
section 35-1-69 was reenacted. Under the current
version, the test for apportioning liability for
compensation requires at least a ten percent preexisting whole person permanent impairment with
additional impairment caused by accident from
employment resulting in permanent total disability
before liability for compensation is apportioned.
This court has noted that the statute itself does not
entitle anyone to benefits for aggravation of a preexisting injury.
"Entitlement to benefits is a
prerequisite to consideration of apportionment.
Where the disability is the result of pre-existing
conditions and not an industrial accident, a claimant
is not entitled to disability benefits." Large, 758 P.2d
at 957.
*1290_ (FN6.) When the medical panel cannot assign
a measurable percentage of responsibility to the
industrial injury, it would seem absurd to conclude
that the Second Injury Fund must assume complete
responsibility for a disability caused solely by a preexisting condition. The purpose of section 35-1-69 is
to apportion liability only where an industrial injury
measurably contributes to a permanent disability
caused in part by a pre-existing condition, not to
simply impose liability on the Second Injury Fund
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(now Employer's Reinsurance Fund) anytime a
worker's disability is caused by a pre-existing
condition.
.
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973 P.2d 440, Esquivel v. Labor Com'n, (Utah App. 1999)
*440 973P.2d440
361 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 1999 UT App 9
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Edward ESQUIVEL, deceased; Norma Esquivel;
Richard
Esquivel; Angel Esquivel; Edica Esquivel; and
Ofelia Herrera, Petitioners,
v.
LABOR COMMISSION, Redd Roofing &
Construction Co., and CNA
Co., Respondents.
No.981084-CA.
Jan. 22, 1999.
Deceased worker's dependents appealed Labor
Commission Appeals Board determination that
workers' compensation carrier was entitled to offset
against its future obligations to dependents of full net
amount of dependents' third-party recovery from
equipment manufacturer.
The Court of Appeals,
Greenwood, Associate P.J., held that: (1) Board's
method of determining offset comported with statutory
scheme, and (2) dependents waived issue of use of
discounting in calculating present value of carrier's
future obligation.
Affirmed.
West Headnotes
[ 1 ] Workers' Compensation <S=> 1939.1
413 —
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(T) Review by Court
413XVI(T)12A Questions of Law or Fact,
Findings, and Verdict
413kl939 Review of Decision of Department,
Commission,
Board,
Officer,
or
Arbitrator
413kl939.1 In General; Questions of Law or
Fact.
Court of Appeals will affirm Labor Commission
Appeal Board's application of the law so long as it is
reasonable. U.C.A.1953, 34A-1-301.
[2] Workers' Compensation <S==>2247
413 —
413XX Effect of Act on Other Statutory or
Common-Law Rights of Action and
Defenses
413XX(C) Action Against Third Persons in General
for Employee's Injury or Death
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413XX(C)6 Amount and Items of Recovery
413k2244 Action by or on Behalf of Employer or
Insurer
413k2247 Expenses of Investigation and
Litigation (Attorney's Fees).
Deduction, from dependents' recovery against thirdparty equipment manufacturer for death of worker, of
attorney fees and costs chargeable to workers'
compensation carrier, followed by reduction of carrier's
future obligation to dependents by full amount of net
recovery, comported with statutory scheme for
disbursement of proceeds of third-party tort actions.
U.C.A.1953, 34A-2-106(5)(a-c).
[3] Workers' Compensation <©=> 1856
413—413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(T) Review by Court
413XVI(T)5 Presentation and Reservation Below
of Grounds of Review
413kl 845 Necessity
413kl 856 Award or Judgment.
[See headnote text below]
[3] Workers' Compensation <®=^ 1907
413 —
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(T) Review by Court
413XVI(T)10 Assignments of Error and Briefs
413kl907 Briefs.
Deceased worker's dependents waived issue of
whether workers' compensation carrier could use
discounting to calculate present value of future
payment obligation to dependents, by failing to directly
address issue either before Labor Commission Appeals
Board or in brief on appeal.
Robert B. Sykes and Ron J. Kramer, Salt Lake City,
for Petitioners.
Theodore E. Kannell and Stephen P. Horvat, Salt
Lake City, for Respondents Redd Roofing &
Construction Co. and CNA Company.
Alan Hennebold, Salt Lake City, for Respondent
Labor Commission.
Before Judges
GARFF. (FN1)

GREENWOOD,

BENCH

OPINION
GREENWOOD, Associate Presiding Judge:
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973 P.2d 440, Esquivel v. Labor Com'n, (Utah App. 1999)
U 1 The dependents of Edward Esquivel petition this
court for review of an order of *441 the Utah Labor
Commission's Appeals Board (the Board), holding that
respondents Redd Roofing & Construction Co. (Redd
Roofing) and CNA Insurance Co. (CNA) were entitled
to an offset against their future workers' compensation
payment obligation to the dependents because the
dependents had obtained a third-party tort judgment for
the death of Esquivel. We affirm the Board's order.
BACKGROUND
H 2 On April 26, 1993, Esquivel was fatally injured
when he fell through a warehouse roof at the Freeport
Center in Clearfield, Utah, while working as a roofer
for Redd Roofing. At the time of the accident,
Esquivel was sweeping gravel from the roof with a
Gravely International (Gravely) brand sweeping
machine.
K 3 Redd Roofing's workers' compensation insurance
carrier, CNA, began paying the statutorily required
workers' compensation benefits to the dependents in
1993. In March 1994, the dependents settled a
negligence lawsuit against the Freeport Center, the
owner of the building where the accident occurred, and
received $375,000. The dependents and CNA entered
into an agreement, approved by the Utah Labor
Commission (Commission), requiring CNA to pay
$205 per week for as long as the dependents were
entitled to benefits under the Workers' Compensation
Act.
H 4 The dependents filed a product liability suit in
federal court against Gravely, the manufacturer of the
sweeping machine Esquivel was using at the time of
the industrial accident. The dependents obtained a
judgment in the amount of $203,507.25.
Upon
learning of this judgment, CNA discontinued its
weekly payments to the dependents. CNA asserted that
because the dependents had received third-party tort
compensation, it was no longer required, under Utah's
third-party tort compensation statute, to continue
making workers' compensation payments. See Utah
Code Ann. § 34A-2-106(5) (1997). (FN2)
H 5 On July 10, 1996, the dependents filed an
Application for Hearing before the Commission,
contending that CNA had wrongfully discontinued
workers' compensation payments. CNA countered that
it was entitled to an offset against future payments
because of the third-party tort recovery. CNA waived
any right to reimbursement for payments already made.
After a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ), the ALJ ordered CNA to resume weekly
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compensation payments to the dependents.
K 6 In his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and Order, the ALJ found that attorney fees in the
Gravely suit were $81,402.90 and costs were
$53,596.38, for a total case "expense" of $134,999.28.
After deducting this expense from the $203,507.25
judgment, a net recovery of $68,507.97 remained. The
ALJ found that because CNA's future obligation
exceeded the net judgment, it was responsible for
100% of the attorney fees and costs. The ALJ also
determined that CNA's lien amount must be reduced by
those fees and costs, thus eliminating that lien. Finally,
the ALJ held that the dependents could retain the entire
net judgment of $68,507.97, and that no amount would
be credited against future payments owed by CNA. ^
K 7 CNA and Redd Roofing filed a Motion for
Review with the Board, claiming the ALJ had
mistakenly subtracted fees and costs twice, effectively
denying CNA its offset. In its Order Granting Motion
for Review, the Board reversed the ALJ and
determined CNA was entitled to an offset of the
$68,507.97 net judgment against its future obligations.
K 8 Relying on Utah Administrative Code Rule 612-1
-4, (FN3) the Board also ruled that *442 CNA could
"determine the extent of its offset by using an 8%
discount rate to comput[e] the present value of its
future liability," and determined that "[t]he present
value of Redd Roofing's liability for future dependents'
benefits, to be offset by the [Gravely suit] award [of
$68,507.97], is $83,000."
U 9 The dependents filed a Petition for Review with
this court.
ISSUES
TJ 10 Two issues must be resolved on appeal: First,
whether the Board erroneously held that CNA was
entitled to offset the full balance of the net proceeds
from the third-party tort recovery against its future
compensation liability to the dependants; and second,
whether the Board erroneously peirmitted CNA to apply
Utah Administrative Code Rule 612-1-4 and discount
its future obligation for workers' compensation benefits
by eight percent to arrive at a present value.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] U 11 We will not disturb an agency's ruling unless
petitioners can establish they have been "substantially
prejudiced" by the agency's erroneous interpretation or
application of the law. See Utah Code Ann. §
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63-46b-16(4)(d) (1997 & Supp.1998). In addition, the
Legislature has granted the Commission broad
discretion to determine the facts and apply the law.
See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-301 (1997) ("The
commission has the duty and the full power,
jurisdiction, and authority to determine the facts and
apply the law in this chapter or any other title or
chapter it administers."). We have previously held that
the statute's "grant of discretion to the Commission to
apply the law requires that we apply an intermediate
standard of review to its determinations." Osman
Home Improvement v. Industrial Comm'n, 958 P.2d
240, 243 (Utah Ct.App.1998) (citing Caporoz v. Labor
Comm'n, 945 P.2d 141, 143 (Utah Ct.App.1997)).
Thus, we will affirm the Board's application of the law
so long as it is reasonable. See Caporoz, 945 P.2d at
143.
ANALYSIS
I. Entitlement to Offset
[2] Tf 12 The dependents contend that the Board
improperly determined that Redd Roofing and CNA
have a "priority first right of reimbursement" in the
third-party tort recovery that "takes precedence over
the claimant's interest."
CNA argues the Board
properly applied the governing statute.
K 13 Distribution of proceeds of a third-party tort
action under Utah's Workers' Compensation Act is
addressed in section 34A-2-106(5), which states:
(5) If any recovery is obtained against a third person,
it shall be disbursed in accordance with Subsections
(5)(a) through (c).
(a) The reasonable expense of the action, including
attorneys' fees, shall be paid and charged
proportionately against the parties as their interests
may appear. Any fee chargeable to the employer or
carrier is to be a credit upon any fee payable by the
injured employee or, in the case of death, by the
dependents, for any recovery had against the third
party.
(b) The person liable for compensation payments
shall be reimbursed, less the proportionate share of
costs and attorneys' fees ... for [workers'
compensation] payments made as follows:

(c) The balance shall be paid to the injured
employee, or the employee's heirs in case of death,

to be applied to reduce or satisfy in full any
obligation thereafter accruing against the person
liable for compensation.
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106(5).
Tf 14 In the dependents' lawsuit against Gravely, the
jury returned a judgment in favor of the dependents in
the amount of $814,029. However, the jury found
Gravely only 25% at fault. The jury apportioned 25%
*443 of the fault to Esquivel and 50% to Redd
Roofing. (FN4) Thus, the dependents were awarded a
gross judgment of only 25% of the total damages; that
is, they were awarded damages of $203,507.25.
U 15 The ALJ determined that attorney costs and fees
totaled $134,999.28. After these fees and costs were
deducted, the dependents' net award, or "balance"
remaining, from the Gravely suit was $68,507.97. In
apportioning the attorney fees between the dependents
and Redd Roofing, the Board recognized that section
34A-2-106(5)(a) requires that fees and costs must be
allocated between the parties "as their interests may
appear." The Board stated that in determining the
parties' interests, "it [was] important to note" that
section 34A-2-106(5)(b) and (c) "grant the first right of
reimbursement and offset to the insurance carrier."
Thus, the Board reasoned, Redd Roofing's share of
attorney fees and costs necessarily had to be
determined first. Only thereafter could the dependents'
share be determined, and, the Board held, would "then
be limited to the amount of the award that remains after
Redd Roofing's share has been deducted."
The
Board's order accordingly apportioned the parties'
shares of attorney fees and costs as follows:
In this case, the amount of the third party judgment
actually available for allocation is $68,507.97, which
represents the amount of the third party judgment
after attorney fees and costs have been deducted.
The present value of Redd Roofing's liability for
future dependents' benefits, to be offset by the third
party award, is $83,000. Because Redd Roofing's
interest in the award is more than the net amount of
the award itself, Redd Roofing holds the entire
interest in the award. Consequently, all attorneys fees
and costs must be allocated to Redd Roofing.
K 16 The Board then concluded that because the
statute required that the "balance" be "applied to
reduce" the insurer's future obligation, CNA was
entitled to "use the third party award to offset its
obligation to make weekly payments to the dependents
until such time as the award has been exhausted."
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K 17 The dependents contend the Board's order failed
to properly allocate costs and fees to Redd Roofing/
CNA. The dependents argue that because the entire
$68,507.97 net judgment was offset against future
workers' compensation benefits, the order is
"manifestly unjust and contrary to the letter and spirit
of [section] 106(5)." (FN5)
U 18 According to the dependents' interpretation of
section 34A2-106(5), the statute requires a "three-step
sequence for disbursement." First, the attorney fees
and costs are to be paid, see Utah Code Ann. §
34A-2-106(5)(a) (1997), with the responsibility for this
amount apportioned among the parties "as their
interests may appear." The injured person receives
"credit" against their share *444 of attorney fees and
costs for the amount apportionable to the employer/
issuer. See id. Second, the insurer is to be reimbursed
for amounts already paid to the injured party. See id.
§ 34A-2-106(5)(b). Third, the dependents assert, the
insurer is to receive an "offset" against future benefits
only after deducting the employee's "credit" for
attorney fees and costs already paid by the carrier.
This analysis requires that attorney fees and costs be
deducted a second time from the "net judgment"~that
is, from the amount remaining after attorney fees and
costs have been deducted to arrive at the amount that
should be "offset"
against future
workers'
compensation payments. We do not agree with the
dependents' description of this last step.
K 19 "Because we assume that the legislature used
each term in the statute advisedly, we read the statute's
words literally 'unless such a reading is unreasonably
confused or inoperable.' " Olsen v. Mclntyre Inv. Co.,
956 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah 1998) (citation omitted). Our
supreme court has stated:
The basic purpose of [the third party recovery]
statute is that of making an equitable arrangement
between an injured employee, and an insurer (or
employer) who pays him workmen's compensation,
with respect to a cause of action against a third party
who injures the employee. It preserves the action to
the employee, but it prevents him from having double
recovery by requiring him to reimburse the insurer. It
also gives the insurer the right to bring the action, but
allows it only to reimburse itself and then pay any
balance to the employee.
Worthen v. Shurtleff& Andrews, Inc., 19 Utah 2d 80,
426 P.2d 223, 225 (1967). Consistent with this
reasoning, the Board determined that subsections (b)
and (c) of section 34A-2-106(5) require that any
balance, after attorney fees and costs have been

Page 4
deducted, must either be used to compensate the
insurer for payments already made, or be applied as an
offset against future obligations.
Because the
$68,507.97 amounted to less than the total future
benefits owed by CNA to the dependents, it merely
"reduced" any future obligation by that amount. The
Board determined that "[a]fter the amount of
$68,507.97 has been [paid to the dependents and] fully
offset against such future benefits, Redd Roofing must
then resume payment" of the workers' compensation
benefits.
^ 20 We believe the Board reasonably applied the
statutory scheme in determining the order in which the
third party recovery is to be disbursed.
Under
Worthen, the statute's subsections are to be read as a
whole, and the sequence in which the statute allocates
funds should be regarded as "having some
significance":
If we do as the statute says and make the allocation
provided for in paragraph [a] first, that is, charging
the recovery [of] the costs and attorney's fees in
proportion to the interests of the parties, the
disbursement stated first is made first, and has
priority over the provision for disbursement which
follows it in paragraph [b]. Then the reimbursement
to the insurer is made from the funds remaining and
to the extent possible after the first requirement for
disbursement is complied with.
Id. at 226. (Emphasis added.) We do not find any
support in the statutory language or case law for the
dependents' argument, and indeed, find that the case
law sets forth the steps that must be taken when
distributing third-party tort recoveries under section
34A-2-106(5).
See, e.g., Graham v. Industrial
Comm'n, 26 Utah 2d 424, 491 P.2d 223, 224 (1971)
(holding statute requires each party bear its share of
attorney fees and expenses before making distribution
of funds); Worthen, 426 P.2d at 225. Therefore, we
reject the distribution "formula" proposed by the
dependents. (FN6)
II. Discounting of Future Benefits to Present Value
[3] Tj 21 Finally, the dependents argue the Board
erred in discounting future benefits to present value
under Utah Administrative Rule 612-1-4.
CNA
counters that because *445. the dependents failed to
oppose CNA's request for discounting when it was
presented to the Board, they have waived their right to
challenge this portion of the Board's order.
U 22 "[I]ssues not raised in proceedings before
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administrative agencies are not subject to judicial
review except in exceptional circumstances." Brown &
Root Indus, v. Industrial Comm'n, 947 P.2d 671, 677
(Utah 1997); see also Werner-Jacobsen v. Bednarik,
946 P.2d 744, 748 (Utah Ct.App.1997) (denying
consideration of issues first raised on appeal); Alvin G.
Rhodes Pump Sales v. Industrial Comm'n, 681 P.2d
1244, 1249 (Utah 1984) (precluding party who failed
to raise issue before administrative agency from raising
issue on appeal).
U 23 Although CNA requested present-value
discounting of its future payment obligation to the
dependents, the dependents' response did not directly
address the issue. Because the transcript was not
included in the record on appeal, it is impossible for us
to determine whether there was any discussion at the
hearing regarding this issue.
Additionally, the
dependents' brief has failed to address how this issue
was preserved for appeal. See Utah R.App. P.
24(a)(5)(A) ("The brief of the appellant shall contain ...
a statement of the issues presented for review ... and
citation to the record showing that the issue was
preserved in the trial court."). Because the issue was
not raised before the Board, and because the
dependents' brief on this issue does not conform to our
Rules of Appellate Procedure, the dependents have
waived their right to appeal this issue.
CONCLUSION
% 24 We conclude that the Board reasonably
determined that Redd Roofing/CNA was responsible
for 100% of the attorney fees and costs, and that the
remaining "net" judgment of $68,507.97 would offset
future workers' compensation amounts owed by CNA.
Additionally, the dependents waived the issue of
whether the Board should have permitted CNA to
discount its future
obligation for workers'
compensation payments to the dependents by eight
percent under Utah Administrative Code Rule 612-1-4.
The order of the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor
Commission is therefore affirmed.
K 25 BENCH, Judge and GARFF, Senior Judge,
concur.
(FN1.) Senior Judge Regnal W. Garff sitting by
special appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78-2-4(2)(1996);
Utah Code Jud. Admin.
R3-108(4).
(FN2.) This statute was previously numbered §
35-1-62 (1993). In 1997, the Utah Legislature
revised Title 35, created Title 34A, and replaced the

Industrial Commission with the Labor Commission.
See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-103 (1997). This
revision resulted in the renumbering of many of the
sections on workers' compensation.
However,
because the sections in effect at the time of the
hearing below do not differ materially from current
statutory provisions, we cite to the most recent
statutes in this opinion.
(FN3.) Rule 612-14 provides that
[e]ight percent shall be used for any discounting or
present value calculations. Lump sums ordered by
the Commission or for any attorney fees paid in a
single up-front amount, or of any other sum being
paid earlier than normally paid under a weekly
benefit method shall be subject to the 8%
discounting.
Utah Admin. Code 612-14 (1998).
(FN4.) Redd Roofing and CNA claim the dependents
did not notify them of the Gravely action, nor of
Gravely's attempt to attribute fault to Redd Roofing,
in violation Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106(3) (1997)
(requiring that "before proceeding against a third
party ..., the employee's heirs, shall give written
notice of the intention to bring an action against the
third party to: (i) the carrier; and (ii) any other
person obligated for the compensation payments.")
(FN5.) Although the dependents assert that the Board's
application of the governing statute is "unfair"
because it gives the insurer priority over the
employee in distributing third-party tort proceeds
even when it is the employee who brings the action,
we do not believe the application is unfair when
viewed in the context of the entire workers'
compensation scheme.
Under our Workers'
Compensation
Act,
the
insurer
guarantees
compensation to all injured employees covered under
its insurance, regardless of fault. See Utah Code
Ann. § 34A-2401(2) (1997) (responsibility for
payment of compensation for employment-related
injury rests with employer);
see id.
§
34A-2-207(l)(a) (1997) (failure to obtain workers'
compensation insurance subjects employer to liability
in civil action brought against it by injured
employee).
The insurer is required to pay
compensation even if the accident is entirely the fault
of the employee or of an unrelated third party. In
exchange, however, the insurer receives priority in
the distribution of any third-party tort proceeds. See
id § 34A-2-106(5)(b). Thus, the statutory scheme
ensures that the injured employee receives
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compensation in some form, which reduces the risk
the employee might face if forced to file a civil
liability action against the employer and/or third
parties. In addition, we agree with CNA that the risk
of filing an action and ending up with no net benefit
is the same encountered in every civil action.
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*445_ (FN6.) We note that the formula proposed by
the dependents is taken from Breen v. Caesars
Palace, 102 Nev. 79, 715 P.2d 1070 (Nev.1986), and
was adopted under a different third-party tort
recovery statutory scheme than Utah's.
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*1281 850 P.2d 1281
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Mark KING, Petitioner,
v.
The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH;
Workers Compensation
Fund; and Superior Roofing Company,
Respondents.
No. 920464-CA.
March 18, 1993.
Workers' compensation claimant sought reversal of
Industrial Commission's order denying him temporary
total disability compensation during specified period.
The Court of Appeals, Billings, P.J., held that: (1)
portion of Workers' Compensation Act providing for
compensation to injured employees does not explicitly
or implicitly grant discretion to Industrial Commission
and, thus, Court of Appeals reviews Commission's
action under that section under Uniform Administrative
Procedures Act (UAPA) section providing for less
deferential correction-of-error standard of review, and
(2) temporary total disability benefits must be paid to
incarcerated claimant until claimant's medical
condition has stabilized, absent specific language in
workers' compensation statutes limiting benefit for
incarcerated recipients.
Reversed and remanded.
Russon, Associate P.J., filed opinion concurring in
result.
West Headnotes
[ 1 ] Administrative Law and Procedure <®^ 676
15A —
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
15AV(A) In General
15 Ak676 Record.
Under Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA),
Court of Appeals, when reviewing factual findings,
examines entire record available to court, not simply
that which supports findings of administrative law
judge. U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4)(g).
[2] Administrative Law and Procedure <&z?754A
15A —
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
15AV(D) Scope of Review in General
15 Ak754 Discretion of Administrative Agency
15Ak754.1 In General.
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[See headnote text below]
[2] Administrative Law and Procedure <@::=>786
15A —
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
15AV(E) Particular Questions, Review of
15Ak784 Fact Questions
15Ak786 Conflicting Evidence.
[See headnote text below]
[2] Administrative Law and Procedure <S==>788
15A —
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
15AV(E) Particular Questions, Review of
15Ak784 Fact Questions
15Ak788 Determination Supported by Evidence in
General.
Court of Appeals' review of factual findings under
Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), is not as
strict as de novo review of proceedings, nor as lenient
as review for "any competent evidence" to support
findings, but rather, it simply accords deference to
agency where two reasonable, yet conflicting,
conclusions could have been reached. U.C.A.1953,
63-46b-16(4)(g).
[3] Administrative Law and Procedure <S=::=>676
15A —
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
15AV(A) In General
15 Ak676 Record.
Appellant must provide transcript of proceedings if
he is going to challenge factual findings under Utah
Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA). U.C.A.1953,
63-46b-16(4)(g); Rules App.Proc, Rule 11(e)(2).
[4] Administrative Law and Procedure <@===>676
15A—15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
15AV(A) In General
15 Ak676 Record.
Petitioner must provide transcript if he argues that
legal conclusion is unsupported by evidence in case.
Rules App.Proc, Rule 11(e)(2).
[5] Administrative Law and Procedure <®=:::>800
15A —
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
15AV(E) Particular Questions, Review of
15Ak800 Statutory Questions.
Where grant of discretion exists, Court of Appeals
will not disturb agency's interpretation or application of
agency-specific law unless its determination exceeds
bounds of reasonableness and rationality. U.C.A.1953,
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63-46b-16(4)(h)(ii).
[6] Administrative Law and Procedure © ^ 8 0 0
15A—15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
15AV(E) Particular Questions, Review of
15Ak800 Statutory Questions.
Court of Appeals reviews agency interpretation or
application of agency-specific statutes where no grant
of discretion exists under correction-of-error standard.
U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-16(4)(d).
[7] Administrative Law and Procedure <S==?741
15A —
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
15AV(D) Scope of Review in General
15Ak741 In General.
Standard of review under Utah Administrative
Procedures Act (UAPA) will vary based on subsection
claim is brought under and, thus, counsel is strongly
encouraged to clearly identify under what section
review is being sought and to identify appropriate
standard of review under that section. U.C.A.1953,
63-46b-16(4).
[8] Administrative Law and Procedure <@=3::>330
15A —
15AIV Powers and Proceedings of Administrative
Agencies, Officers and Agents
15AIV(A) In General
15Ak330 Statutes, Construction and Application
Of.
Explicit grant of discretion to agency to interpret or
apply agency-specific statutory law, which warrants
more deferential standard of review, can be found
when statute specifically authorizes agency to interpret
or apply statutory language.
U.C.A.1953,
63-46b-16(4)(d),(h)(i).
[9] Administrative Law and Procedure <S==>330
15A —
15AIV Powers and Proceedings of Administrative
Agencies, Officers and Agents
15AIV(A) In General
15Ak330 Statutes, Construction and Application
Of.
Court of Appeals can find implicit grants of
discretion to agency to interpret or apply agencyspecific statutory law, warranting more deferential
standard of review, in broad and generalized statutory
language, as such language indicates legislative intent
to delegate interpretative powers to agency.
U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-16(4)(d), (h)(i).
[ 10] Statutes <@==>219(2)
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361 —
3 61VI Construction and Operation
3 61 VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361k213 Extrinsic Aids to Construction
3 61 k219 Executive Construction
361k219(2) Existence of Ambiguity.
If Court of Appeals finds that there are multiple
permissible interpretations of language in agencyspecific statute, it must defer to agency's policy choice.
U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-16(4)(d), (h)(i).
[11] Statutes <S=»219(1)
361 —
361VI Construction and Operation
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
3 61 k213 Extrinsic Aids to Construction
3 61 k219 Executive Construction
361k219(l) In General.
Consideration of agency's expertise and experience is
relevant in determining whether agency should make
necessary policy choice and thus be granted deference
by reviewing court regarding interpretation or
application of agency-specific
statutory law.
U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-16(4)(d), (h)(i).
[12] Administrative Law and Procedure <®==>800
15A —
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
15AV(E) Particular Questions, Review of
15Ak800 Statutory Questions.
In determining whether agency has been granted
discretion to interpret or apply agency-specific
statutory law, so as to warrant more deferential
standard of review under Utah Administrative
Procedures Act (UAPA), Court of Appeals first
determines whether legislature explicitly granted
discretion to agency and, if explicit grant is not found,
Court examines language of statute and statutory
framework for implicit grant of discretion.
U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-16(4)(d), (h)(i).
[13] Administrative Law and Procedure ® ^ 8 0 0
15A —
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
15AV(E) Particular Questions, Review of
15Ak800 Statutory Questions.
Court of Appeals can find explicit grant of discretion
to agency to interpret or apply agency-specific
statutory law, warranting more deferential standard of
review under Utah Administrative Procedures Act
(UAPA), in specific statutory' language directing
agency to define statutory term by regulation and,
additionally, statute directing agency to interpret or
apply specific statutory language should be interpreted
as explicit grant of discretion.
U.C.A.1953,
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63-46b-16(4)(d),(h)(i).
[14] Administrative *1281 Law and Procedure®^
800
15A —
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
15AV(E) Particular Questions, Review of
15Ak800 Statutory Questions.
If statutory language is broad and expansive or
subject to numerous interpretations, Court of Appeals
will assume that legislature has chosen to defer to
policy-making expertise of agency and will find
implicit grant of discretion to agency to interpret or
apply statutory law, warranting more deferential
standard of review under Utah Administrative
Procedures Act. U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-16(4)(d), (h)(i).
[15] Administrative Law and Procedure <@=:=>800
15A —
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
15AV(E) Particular Questions, Review of
15Ak800 Statutory Questions.
Court of Appeals reviews agency action under Utah
Administrative Procedures Act's (UAPA's) less
deferential correction of error standard if statutory
language is unambiguous and court can interpret and
apply statutory language by traditional methods of
statutory construction, utilizing its own expertise to
define
legislative
intent.
U.C.A.1953,
63-46b-16(4)(d),(h)(i).
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"Medical stabilization" for purposes of requirement
that temporary total workers' compensation benefits
continue until claimant's condition has stabilized, is
independent of ability of claimant to return to work.
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45.
[18] Workers' Compensation <§==>839
413
413IX Amount and Period of Compensation
413IX(B) Compensation for Disability
413IX(B)1 In General
413k839 Duration and Termination of Period.
Temporary total disability benefits must be paid to
incarcerated claimant until claimant's medical
condition has stabilized, absent specific language in
workers' compensation statutes limiting benefits for
incarcerated recipients. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45.
[19] Workers' Compensation <®=::::>45
413
4131 Nature and Grounds of Master's Liability
413k44 Construction and Operation of Statutes in
General
413k45 In General.
Omissions in Workers' Compensation Act are
significant and statute should be applied according to
its literal wording. U.C.A.1953, 35-1- to 35-1-107.
[20] Workers' Compensation <S=>1
413 —
4131 Nature and Grounds of Master's Liability
413kl In General.

[ 16] Workers' Compensation <@^=> 1910
413 —
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(T) Review by Court
413XVI(T)12 Scope and Extent of Review in
General
413kl910 In General.
Portion of Workers' Compensation Act providing for
compensation to injured employees does not explicitly
or implicitly grant discretion to Industrial Commission
and, thus, Court of Appeals reviews Commission's
action under that section under Uniform Administrative
Procedures Act (UAPA) section providing for less
deferential correction-of-error standard of review.
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45, 63-46b-16(4)(d).

[20] Workers' Compensation <S=>511
413
413VIII Injuries for Which Compensation May Be
Had
413VIII(A) Nature and Character of Physical Harm
413VIII(A)1 In General
413k511 In General.
Workers' Compensation Act is based on contract
principles and employee's right to benefits arises when
he suffers work-related injury. U.C.A.1953, 35-1- to
35-1-107.

[17] Workers' Compensation <®=:>865
413 —
413IX Amount and Period of Compensation
413IX(B) Compensation for Disability
413IX(B)4 Temporary and Permanent Disability
413k864 Temporary Disability Followed by
Permanent Disability
413k865 In General.

[21 ] Workers' Compensation <®=>801
413 —
413IX Amount and Period of Compensation
413IX(A) Basis for Determination of Amount
413k801 In General.
Absent explicit statutory provision, Industrial
Commission is not free to reduce statutorily created
workers' compensation benefits. U.C.A.1953, 35-1- to

[See headnote text below]
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35-1-107.
*1283 Robert Breeze (argued), Salt Lake City, for
petitioner.

period was not related to the industrial accident
whatsoever, but, rather, was solely due to the actions or
conduct of the applicant which resulted in his being
*1284 incarcerated."
The Industrial Commission
affirmed the order of the ALJ. This appeal followed.

Richard G. Sumsion (argued), Salt Lake City, for
respondents.
Before BILLINGS and GREENWOOD, JJ., and
RUSSON, Associate P.J.
OPINION
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge:
Petitioner Mark King seeks reversal of an Order of
the Industrial Commission of Utah denying him
temporary total disability compensation for the period
of his incarceration at the Utah State Prison and for the
period after his release until corrective surgery was
performed. We reverse and remand for the calculation
and payment of benefits.
FACTS
King suffered an on-the-job injury to his wrist on
November 20, 1989, while working for Superior
Roofing Company. King received temporary total
disability benefits from the Utah Workers'
Compensation Fund from November 21, 1989 through
May 22, 1990. The Fund also paid medical expenses.
King was scheduled for surgery to correct his wrist
injury on May 30, 1990. However, on May 22, 1990,
King was incarcerated at the Utah State Prison for a
parole violation. Because of his incarceration, surgery
was postponed.
Temporary total disability
compensation was terminated during the period of
King's incarceration and for the period after his release
until corrective surgery was performed. King was
released from prison on October 13, 1990. King was
admitted for surgery on January 29, 1991 and surgery
was performed on January 30, 1991. Temporary total
disability compensation resumed on January 29, 1991
and continued through July 14, 1991, covering the
period of King's surgery and recovery.
On July 9, 1991 an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
denied King's claim for temporary total disability
benefits during the period from May 22, 1990 through
January 28, 1991. The ALJ further ordered that the
Workers' Compensation Fund was entitled to a credit
for all temporary total compensation paid to King after
May 22, 1990 and before January 29, 1991. The ALJ
determined King's "loss of wages for the claimed
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal, King seeks temporary total disability
compensation for the period between May 22, 1990
and January 28, 1991, the period of his incarceration
and the period after his release until corrective surgery
was performed.
King contends the Industrial
Commission erroneously interpreted and applied the
workers' compensation statutes in denying him
compensation.
Because the proceedings in this case began after
January 1, 1988, we review them under the Utah
Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA). See Utah
Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-0.5 to -22 (1989 & Supp.1992).
Judicial review of agency action under UAPA is
controlled by Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1989).
Section 4 of that statute enumerates the situations
under which a court can grant relief. (FN1) Because
the controlling precedent from the Utah Supreme Court
is less than clear (FN2) and because of divergence in
recent opinions of this court over how we discern the
appropriate standard of review under UAPA, we take
the opportunity today to discuss the issue in depth.
Compare Putvin v. Tax Comm'n, 837 P.2d 589 (Utah
App. 1992) (FN3) (finding grant of discretion in broad
statutory language without identifying whether it was
explicit or implicit) with Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Tax
Comm'n, 847 P.2d 418, 420, n. 6, (Utah App.1993)
(FN4) (finding no explicit grant of discretion because
no statutory directive to interpret a term). We feel
compelled to take this approach due to the admonitions
this court recently received from the supreme court in
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993). In that
case, which resolved a conflict in this court regarding
the standard of review applicable in certain criminal
matters, the supreme court noted its
uneasiness with the persistence of the division in the
court of appeals on this [standard of review] issue.
To the extent that this disagreement simply represents
an evolution of two conflicting interpretations of the
same legal doctrine by different panels of judges, its
persistence is contrary to the doctrine of stare
decisis....
... It is one thing to admit that differences among
judges on a particular legal question can exist; it is
quite another to *1285 sanction variability in the
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rule of law depending solely on which of several
judges of an appellate court sit on a given case.
Id. at 1271. Thus, to eliminate any confusion as to
the analytical model this court is following to
determine the appropriate standard of review under
UAPA, we engage in a rather laborious discussion of
the standard of review.
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cert, denied, 776 P.2d 916 (Utah 1989). Thus, our
procedural rules specifically require a petitioner to
provide a transcript of the proceedings if he is going to
challenge
factual
findings
under
subsection
63-46b-16(4)(g). A petitioner must also provide a
transcript if he argues a legal conclusion is unsupported
by the evidence in the case. Otherwise we have no
basis on which to evaluate the findings and
conclusions.

A. Issues of Fact
B. Issues of General Law
[1][2] Under UAPA, the standard we apply when
reviewing factual findings is clear.
The only
subsection under which factual findings can be
challenged is 63-46b-16(4)(g). Under that subsection,
we will change a factual finding only if it "is not
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light
of the whole record before the court." Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-16(4)(g) (1989). Accord Zissi v. Tax
Comm'n, 842 P.2d 848, 852-54 (Utah 1992). "
'Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable person
"might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."' "
Stewart v. Board of Review, 831 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah
App. 1992) (quoting Merriam v. Board of Review, 812
P.2d 447, 450 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting Grace
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah
App. 1989))). To reach our conclusion we examine the
entire record available to the court, not simply that
which supports the findings of the ALJ. Id. Thus,
Petitioner necessarily has the burden of marshaling "all
of the evidence supporting the findings and show[ing]
that despite the supporting facts, and in light of the
conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings are
not supported by substantial evidence."
Grace
Drilling, 776 P.2d at 68.
Accord Hales Sand &
Gravel Inc. v. Tax Comm'n, 842 P.2d 887, 890 (Utah
1992). This review is not as strict as a de novo review
of the proceedings, nor as lenient as a review for "any
competent evidence" to support the findings, it simply
accords deference to the agency where two reasonable,
yet conflicting, conclusions could have been reached.
See Grace Drilling, 776 P.2d at 68 & n. 7.
[3] [4] Additionally, the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure govern how we review agency actions. See
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(2)(b) (1989).
Rule
11(e)(2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
provides: "If the appellant intends to urge on appeal
that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is
contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall include in
the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such
finding or conclusion."
Utah R.App.P. 11(e)(2).
Rule 11 requires counsel provide the appellate court
with all evidence pertinent to the issues on appeal. See
Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1102 (Utah App.),

The standard we apply when an agency interprets or
applies general law such as case law, constitutional
law, or non-agency specific legislative acts is also
clear. Our review in this area is guided by section
63-46b-16(4)(d). As we did prior to UAPA, we review
agency interpretations of general law "under a
correction of error standard, giving no deference to the
agency's decision." Questar Pipeline Co. v. Tax
Comm'n, 817 P.2d 316, 318 (Utah 1991). See also
Zissi v. Tax Comm'n, 842 P.2d 848, 852-54 (Utah
1992) (holding issues of law are reviewed for
correctness under § 63-46b-16(4)(d)); Savage Indus.,
Inc. v. Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664, 670 (Utah 1991)
(finding agency's erroneous interpretation of law is
grounds for relief under § 63-46b-16(4)(d)). In Morton
International, Inc. v. Auditing Division, 814 P.2d 581
(Utah 1991), the supreme court articulated the reason
for the correction of error *1286 standard is not
simply because the court characterizes an issue as one
of general law but because the agency has no special
experience or expertise placing it in a better position
than the courts to construe the law. Id. at 586.
C. Issues of Agency-Specific Law
[5] [6] We are faced with a far more difficult task in
deciding the amount of deference to grant an agency's
interpretation or application of agency-specific
statutory law. In that instance, we grant deference only
"when there is a grant of discretion to the agency
concerning the language in question, either expressly
made in the statute or implied from the statutory
language." Id. at 589. (FN5) If there is a grant of
discretion we review the agency action under Utah
Code Ann § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) (1989). See Chicago
Bridge & Iron Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 839 P.2d 303 (Utah
1992). Where a grant exists, we will not disturb the
agency's interpretation or application of the law unless
its determination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness
and rationality. Morton, 814 P.2d at 586-87, 589, 592;
Cross v. Board of Review, 824 P.2d 1202, 1204 (Utah
App. 1992).
"[A]bsent a grant of discretion, a
correction-of-error standard is used in reviewing an
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agency's interpretation or application of a statutory
term." Morton, 814 P.2d at 588. See also Mor-Flo
Indus., Inc. v. Board of Review, 817 P.2d 328, 330
(Utah App.1991), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah
1992). In other words, we review agency interpretation
or application of agency-specific statutes where no
grant of discretion exists under Utah Code Ann. §
63-46b-16(4)(d). See Bennion v. Graham Resources,
Inc., 849 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah 1993).
[7] [8] The difficulty arises in determining whether an
agency has been granted discretion and thus whether
our review is governed by section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i).
In Morton the supreme court reviewed the impact of
UAPA on the standard of review an appellate court
should utilize when an agency interprets or applies an
agency-specific statute. Morton indicates that review
under section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) represents a "break
from prior law." Morton, 814 P.2d at 588. (FN6) It
held "an agency's statutory *1287 construction should
be given deference when there is a grant of discretion
to the agency concerning the language in question,
either expressly made in the statute or implied from the
statutory language." Id. at 589. However, Morton
does not detail what the term explicit grant of
discretion means. In Morton, the example of an
explicit grant of discretion to an agency relates to the
Tax Commission deciding whether a piece of
equipment qualifies for an exemption from the sales
and use tax. Id. at 588 n. 40. The statute allows the
exemption if the equipment is a "normal operating
replacement ... as determined by the commission"
Utah Code Ann.§ 59-12-104(15) (1992) (emphasis
added). Thus, an explicit grant of discretion can be
found when a statute specifically authorizes an agency
to interpret or apply statutory language.
[9] [10] Morton also discusses when an implicit grant
of discretion is present. We can find implicit grants of
discretion in "broad and generalized" statutory
language because such language indicates a legislative
intent to delegate interpretative powers to the agency.
Morton, 814 P.2d at 588.
Articulated somewhat
differently, if we find there are multiple permissible
interpretations of statutory language we must defer to
the agency's policy choice. Id. at 589. However, if we
can derive the legislative intent in the statute by
"traditional methods of statutory construction, [there is
no implicit grant of discretion and] the agency's
interpretation will be granted no deference and the
statute will be interpreted in accord with its legislative
intent." Id. at 589.
[11] In one of its more confusing sections^ Morton
tells us "to the extent that our cases can be read as
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granting deference to an agency's decisions based
solely on the agency's expertise," they are inconsistent
with UAPA's command that we defer only on the basis
of a statutory grant of authority. Morton, 814 P.2d at
587 (emphasis added). The court then immediately
responds to this statement by recognizing the changes it
discusses in standard of review "may not have
significant effect." Id. We take this to mean that
consideration of an agency's expertise and experience
is relevant in determining whether the agency should
make the necessary policy choice and thus be granted
deference by the reviewing court. (FN7) Morton
specifically states it should not be read as holding the
ways of finding grants of discretion which it discusses
"are the only methods of determining whether the
legislature has granted the agency discretion in dealing
with an issue." Morton, 814 P.2d at 589.
Morton's directive that we seek out grants of
discretion before applying the *1288 deferential
standard of review under 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) has led
this court to expend significant judicial resources on
ascertaining the appropriate standard of review in
appeals from executive agency decisions.
Two
somewhat different approaches have arisen in this court
following Morton. Given the emerging nature of the
law, this result is not surprising.
The approach this court originally took is exemplified
by Tasters Ltd. v. Department of Employment Security,
819 P.2d 361 (Utah App.1991). (FN8) In Tasters, the
issue was the Department's interpretation and
application of Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-22(j)(5)
(Supp.1989) (current version at id. § 35-4-22.3
(Supp.1992)). That statute directs the Department to
consider twenty factors in determining if an individual
is an employee or an independent contractor. We
found the language of the statute directing the agency
to apply the statute "indicates an explicit grant of
discretion" to the agency to determine whether an
individual is an employee or an independent contractor.
Tasters, 819 P.2d at 364. The language the court
relied on provided:
"unless it is shown to the
satisfaction of the commission," the "[commission
determines that the] weight of the evidence supports
the finding" and "considered [by the commission] if
applicable."
Id. (quoting Utah Code Ann. §
35-4-22(j)(5) (Supp.1989)). Thus, the statute in which
we found an explicit grant of discretion authorized the
commission to apply specific statutory language.
Other panels have followed the analysis used in
Tasters. Recently, in Putvin v. Tax Commission, 837
P.2d 589 (Utah App. 1992), (FN9) the case turned on
whether the petitioner met the statutory definition of
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nonresident for Tax Code purposes. We held the Tax
Commission's determination was entitled to deference.
In doing so, we recognized a general grant of authority
to the Tax Commission to administer the statutes under
which it operates and that the Tax Commission often
makes determinations of residency status. Id. at 590.
Thus, it could be argued we found an explicit grant of
discretion. We also, however, recognized factors that
would support a conclusion an implicit grant of
discretion had been given. First, we acknowledged
neither the statutory context nor normal statutory
construction were helpful in determining what the
legislature intended. Id. at 591.
Second, we
recognized the statutory term was subject to several
possible interpretations and had been defined by
detailed administrative regulations.
Id.
Thus,
interpretation of the statute was better left to the policy
expertise of the Commission. (FN 10)
While we have not always articulated why we have
found a grant of discretion or whether the discretion
should be characterized as explicit or implicit, the
result has been consistent with Morton. In each case
the language of the statute and the statutory scheme
support a finding of at least an implicit grant of
discretion. For example, in Johnson-Bowles Co. v.
Department of Commerce, 829 P.2d 101 (Utah App.),
(FN11) cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992), we
granted deference to the agency where its statutory
scheme provided the executive director could penalize
a broker "if he finds that" the broker has "engaged in
dishonest or unethical" practices. Id. at 114 (quoting
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-6(1) (1989)). We held such
language "bespeaks a legislative intent to delegate the
interpretation of what constitutes dishonest and
unethical practices in the securities industry...." *I289
Id. Hence, although we did not articulate it, what we
did under Morton was find the statutory language
"broad and expansive" and capable of multiple
interpretations thus indicating an implicit grant of
discretion by the legislature.
Likewise, in Department of Air Force v. Swider, 824
P.2d 448 (Utah App.1991), (FN12) we did not
articulate the exact step under the Morton analysis
where we found the agency had been granted discretion
by the legislature. In Swider, an aircraft mechanic had
been discharged from employment at Hill Air Force
Base for drug use. He applied for unemployment
benefits and after a hearing by an ALJ was granted
them. The Board of Review upheld the ALJ's decision.
The Air Force challenged the Board's conclusion the
defendant was not " 'culpable' for the purposes of
establishing a 'just cause' termination." Id. at 450. We
found statutory language permitting a denial of benefits
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if a termination was for " 'just cause ... if so found by
the commission' " constituted the requisite grant of
discretion. Id. at 451 (emphasis in original) (quoting
Utah Code Ann § 35-4-5(b)(l) (Supp.1991)). Under
Morton, this was the appropriate result because the
operative language authorized the Board to interpret
and apply specific statutory language. As the supreme
court noted would often be the case, the standard of
review is the same as that we would have applied under
the prior approach where we granted deference based
on agency expertise. Morton, 814 P.2d at 588. See
also Bhatia v. Department of Employment Sec.; 834
P.2d 574, 577 (Utah App.1992) (FN13) (following
Swider ); Robinson v. Department of Employment
Sec, 827 P.2d 250, 252 (Utah App.1992) (FN14)
(finding explicit grant of discretion based on statutory
language authorizing agency to determine issue of
"voluntariness" and "good cause").
See also
Valgardson Housing Sys. Inc. v. Tax Comm'n, 849
P.2d 618, 620-21 (Utah App. 1993) (finding implicit
grant of discretion in Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(13)
(1987)).
Recently, Judge Bench has articulated a slightly
different view of the appropriate analysis mandated by
Morton.
Under his reading, the first question is
whether there is an explicit grant of discretion to the
agency. (FN15) Ferro v. Department of Commerce,
828 P.2d 507, 510 & n. 5 (Utah App.1992) (FN16)
(citing Morton, 814 P.2d at 589).
If there is an
explicit grant of discretion *1290 the court applies a
deferential standard of review. Bhatia, 834 P.2d at 581
(Bench, P.J., concurring). As one of the keys to this
analysis, Judge Bench has indicated what he thinks the
supreme court meant when it spoke of "explicit grants
of discretion."
In his view, that term means the
"legislature must direct or authorize the agency to
define the statutory term by rule." Id. (FN 17) If no
explicit grant exists then the court determines whether
the statute is ambiguous. Ferro, 828 P.2d at 510. If
not, the court "applies the statute according to its plain
meaning." Id. If the statute is ambiguous the court
attempts to apply the traditional rules of statutory
construction. Id. If it can do so, and divine the intent
of the legislature, it applies a correction of error
standard. Id. If traditional statutory construction does
not produce a legislative intent the court will then
assume the legislature intended for the agency to make
a judgment concerning the appropriate policy and find
an implicit grant of discretion. Id. at 510-11.
There are two major distinctions between the analysis
Judge Bench has recently advocated and that applied in
some earlier cases. First, opinions applying the earlier
analysis have found explicit legislative grants of
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discretion in statutory language which is much broader
than simply a legislative directive to define a term by
rule. Second, rather than applying plain meaning and
other statutory construction methods as independent
steps in the analysis, the earlier opinions use statutory
construction as a tool in deciding whether the statute
contains an implicit grant of discretion.
We turn now to Utah Supreme Court cases to
determine whether they have applied the analysis
articulated by Judge Bench or the broader one used in
the earlier opinions issued by this court. Morton itself
provides the answer. In footnote 40, the court gives the
following example of an explicit grant of discretion by
the legislature.
For example, section 59-12-104(16) provides for
"sales or leases of machinery and equipment
purchased or leased by a manufacturer for use in new
or expanding operations (excluding normal operating
replacements ... as determined by the commission)."
(Emphasis added.)
Morton, 814 P.2d at 589 n. 40. This illustration does
not show a specific legislative directive to define a
statutory term by rule as Judge Bench would require.
Rather, it is a grant of authority to the commission to
interpret or apply statutory language. This language
constitutes the explicit grant of discretion that requires
a reviewing court to apply an intermediate standard of
review to agency action under the statute.
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some determinations of the Tax Commission. The
court, without identifying whether it found an explicit
or implicit grant of discretion, held the Commission
had discretion to interpret the statutory terms "repairs"
and "renovations." Id. at 883-84.
Regardless of
whether the supreme court found an explicit grant or an
implicit grant, it looked for a grant of discretion prior
to construing the statute on its own, as have our earlier
opinions.
In addition, the court has frequently found implicit
grants of discretion and has not applied statutory
construction as a separate step in its analysis. See, e.g.,
BJ-Titan Serv. v. Tax Comm'n, 842 P.2d 822, 827-28,
(Utah 1992) (holding Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-4(1)
(Supp.1986) (current version at id. § 59-12-103(l)(a)
(1992)) contains implicit grant of discretion); Chicago
Bridge & Iron Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 839 P.2d 303,
306-08 (Utah 1992) (applying reasonableness review
to Tax Commission's determination individual is a
"real property contractor" because such determination
is based in part on law and in part on fact). As with
our earlier opinions, the supreme court uses statutory
construction as a tool in ascertaining whether an
implicit grant of discretion exists. See, e.g., Nucor
Corp. v. Tax Comm'n, 832 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1992)
(applying reasonableness review to agency's
interpretation of statutory language based on implicit
grant because language subject to multiple
interpretations).

Additionally, Morton twice states the question the
court is reviewing is one of "statutory construction or
application, and absent a grant of discretion, the
Commission's decision will be reviewed" for
correctness. Id. at 589 & 592 (emphasis added). Thus,
it is not simply interpretation or definition of statutory
language we review under section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i),
but application of that language as well. Moreover,
Morton discusses agency actions in terms of "dealing
with statutory terms" and "dealing with an issue," not
"interpreting" or "defining" statutory terms. See id. at
588 & 589. Likewise, nothing in the language of
section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) supports the limitation
Judge Bench proposes. Consequently, Morton refutes
a cornerstone of Judge Bench's analysis, that an
explicit grant of discretion can only be found in
language directing the agency to define a statutory term
by rule.

[12][13] We now articulate the analytical model we
have derived from Morton for determining if the more
deferential standard of 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) is to be
utilized in reviewing an agency action. This model
applies in all UAPA cases dealing with either the
interpretation or application of agency-specific law by
an agency. First, we determine whether the legislature
explicitly granted discretion to the agency to interpret
or apply statutory language at issue. As Judge Bench
has rightly noted, we can find an explicit grant of
discretion in specific statutory language directing the
agency to define a statutory term by regulation.
Additionally, a statute directing the agency to interpret
or apply specific statutory language should be
interpreted as an explicit grant of discretion. If we find
such a grant,
we review under
section
63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) for abuse of discretion. That is, we
afford the agency some deference and assess whether
its action is within the bounds of reasonableness.

Furthermore, in Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Tax
Commission, 842 P.2d 876 (Utah 1992), a post Morton
opinion, the Utah Supreme Court applies the broader
analysis. In that case the railroad challenged *1291

[14] [15] Second, if we do not find an explicit grant of
discretion, we examine the language of the statute and
the statutory framework for an implicit grant of
discretion. (FN 18) If the statutory language is broad
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and expansive or subject to numerous interpretations
we will assume the legislature has chosen to defer to
the policy making expertise of the agency and we will
find an implicit grant of discretion and review the
action under section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) for abuse of
discretion. If, on the other hand, the language is
unambiguous and we can interpret and apply the
statutory language by the traditional methods of
statutory construction, utilizing our own expertise to
divine the legislative intent, we review the agency
action under section 63-46b-16(4)(d) for correction of
error.
[16] Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (1988) is the portion
of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act at issue here.
Without articulating the analysis we have set out
above, we have previously held "section 35-1-45 does
not expressly or impliedly grant discretion to the
Industrial Commission...." Cross v. Board of Review,
824 P.2d 1202, 1204 (Utah App. 1992). Accord Stokes
v. Board of Review, 832 P.2d 56, 58 (Utah App. 1992).
This holding is in harmony with the analysis we
explain today.
Section 35-1-45 does not contain a directive to
interpret or apply a statutory *1292 term. Thus, it
does not contain an explicit grant of discretion.
Further, because the language is not broad and
expansive but is narrow and mandatory and is subject
to construction by traditional rules of statutory
construction, the statute does not contain an implicit
grant of discretion.
We, therefore, review the
Industrial Commission's action under section 35-1-45
under UAPA section 63-46b-16(4)(d) for correctness.
Accord Stokes, 832 P.2d at 58; Cross, 824 P.2d at
1204.
TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY
COMPENSATION
On appeal, King claims he has been denied his
statutory right to temporary total disability
compensation. The Industrial Commission argues
King was appropriately denied benefits because the
extended period of his disability was due to his
"incarceration and the unavailability of medical care,
circumstances over which the defendants had no
control." The Industrial Commission concedes that
workers' compensation benefits should not be
terminated merely as a result of incarceration. Instead,
the Commission, in denying benefits, focuses on the
extension of the period of King's disability as a result
of his incarceration.
A. Workers' Compensation Act
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Workers' compensation is a statutorily-created
benefit. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 35-1-1 to -107 (1988
& Supp.1992). Section 35-1-45 is the provision of the
Utah Workers' Compensation Act relevant in the
instant case. It provides:
Each employee ... who is injured ... by accident
arising out of and in the course of his employment,
wherever such injury occurred, if the accident was
not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid
compensation for loss sustained on account of the
injury or death, and such amount for medical, nurse,
and hospital services and medicines....
The
responsibility for compensation and payment of
medical, nursing, and hospital services and
medicines, and funeral expenses provided under this
chapter shall be on the employer and its insurance
carrier and not on the employee.
Id § 35-1-45 (1988) (emphasis added).
[17] Once awarded, temporary total workers'
compensation benefits "are to continue 'until [the
claimant's] condition has stabilized.' " Booms v. Rapp
Constr. Co., 720 P.2d 1363, 1366 (Utah 1986)
(quoting Entwistle v. Wilkins, 626 P.2d 495, 497 (Utah
1981)). Medical stabilization is the time when " 'the
period of healing has ended and the condition of the
claimant will not materially improve.' " Reddish v.
Sentinel Consumer Prod, 111 P.2d 1103, 1104 (Utah
App. 1989) (quoting Booms, 720 P.2d at 1366). "When
a claimant reaches medical stabilization, he is no
longer eligible for temporary benefits and his status
must be reassessed." Griffith v. Industrial Comm'n,
754 P.2d 981, 983 (Utah App.1988).
Medical
stabilization is independent of the ability of the
claimant to return to work. Reddish, 111 P.2d at 1104.
Thus, "temporary disability benefits are properly
discontinued as soon as the point of medical
stabilization is reached, regardless of whether the
claimant is actually able to return to work." Id.
King's injury did not achieve medical stabilization
until corrective surgery was performed. During the
period of his incarceration he was not medically
stabilized. Therefore, unless an exception is applied,
under the Utah workers' compensation scheme, King
qualifies for benefits for the period of his incarceration
and the period after his release until corrective surgery
was performed.
B. Incarceration
[18] Whether a claimant who is not medically
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stabilized may be denied temporary total disability
compensation while incarcerated is an issue of first
impression in Utah. Other jurisdictions are split on the
issue of whether one receiving workers' compensation
benefits loses those benefits
*1293
upon
incarceration. However, many courts which have
considered the issue have concluded disability benefits
should be paid to an incarcerated claimant. (FN 19) A
review of the reasoning articulated by some of the
courts awarding benefits is helpful in our resolution of
this first impression issue.
In re Spera, 713 P.2d 1155 (Wyo.1986), is a
particularly well-reasoned decision. In Spera, the
claimant received temporary total disability payments
until January 21, 1985, the date the district court
learned he had been incarcerated. The court ordered
the suspension of further payments while the claimant
remained in jail.
The district judge reasoned
incarceration, rather than the work-related injury, was
the legal intervening cause of his lost wages. (FN20)
In reversing the district court's suspension of payments,
the Wyoming Supreme Court held a worker's
incarceration does not require a suspension of
temporary total disability payments. Id. at 1158.
Stressing that workers' compensation law is based on
"contract" rather than tort principles, the Spera court
held the worker's right to benefits arises when he
suffers a work-related injury. See id. at 1156-57. The
court explained the Wyoming workers' compensation
scheme "is based on a concept of industrial insurance,"
which means "it is based on contract rather than tort
principles." Id. at 1156. Under contract principles the
worker should not be denied benefits unless a provision
in the statutory contract between the worker, the state,
and the employer explicitly suspends the benefits. The
court explains:
Instead of suing his employer for negligence and
having to prove duty, breach, proximate cause, and
damages, the worker in our state must file for
worker's compensation benefits for which his
employer is ultimately liable. Essentially, the system
provides disability insurance coverage for the worker.
His right to benefits arises when certain conditions
precedent occur, primarily, when he suffers a
disabling work-related injury.
Under contract
principles, the worker should not be denied his
benefits after the contingency arises, unless a
provision in the statutory contract between the
worker, on the one hand, and the State and employer,
on the other, explicitly suspends the benefits.
... Benefits under the statute terminate only when
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the worker recovers because only then does he regain
his earning power. Incarceration has no effect upon
benefits which are in the nature of insurance which
has become payable as a covered loss....
*1294 ....
... The worker's disability payments cannot be
characterized as mere governmental largesse that can
be eliminated when the worker's needs are fulfilled
from another governmental source. Rather, the
worker's statutory right to disability payments is akin
to a contract right. Nobody would argue, in the
private insurance context, that an insurer could
withhold payments due under an insurance contract
just because the insured had a second policy which
covered the same disability....
We believe this same principle should apply to
industrial insurance created by statute. Because there
is no statutory exception which eliminates benefits
when a worker is jailed, the benefits are due the
worker even if his needs are fulfilled from another
governmental source. The state legislature can
change our statute to suspend payments during
periods of incarceration, much like a private insurer
might place conditions on his coverage. But in the
absence of legislation, we decline the State's
invitation to make that policy shift ourselves.
Id. at 1157-58 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
Similarly, in Bearden v. Industrial Commission, 14
Ariz.App. 336, 483 P.2d 568 (1971), the claimant was
awarded temporary disability for a compensable
industrial injury and then incarcerated in the Arizona
State Prison following a felony conviction. The
Arizona Court of Appeals reversed the denial of
benefits and held the right to workers' compensation
was not forfeited or suspended during a period of
incarceration. See id., 14 Ariz.App. at 343, 483 P.2d at
575. In reaching this conclusion, the Bearden court
reviewed relevant provisions of Arizona's workers'
compensation statutes.
Arizona's statutes simply
provided that benefits "shall be paid." Id. at 341, 483
P.2d at 573. The court enumerated provisions of the
statutes which suspended or reduced workers'
compensation under specified circumstances. As with
Utah's statutes, Arizona's statutes contained no
provision for the forfeiture or suspension of workers'
compensation benefits based on incarceration. The
court stated "the Arizona Legislature has not provided
for the forfeiture or suspension of compensation and
accident benefits during the period of the prison
confinement of a claimant serving a sentence less than

Copyright
West Group
2002
claimJ. to
original
Govt, BYU.
works
Digitized by (c)
the Howard
W. Hunter
LawNo
Library,
Reuben
ClarkU.S.
Law School,
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

850 P.2d 1281, King v. Industrial Coirin of Utah, (Utah App. 1993)
life." Id. The Bearden court concluded:
No constitutional or statutory provision relating
directly to workmen's compensation has been brought
to our attention which declares that a person whose
civil rights are suspended ... thereby forfeits his right
to compensation.... Whether that should be the law is
a matter of public policy which should be determined
by the Legislature.
Id. at 341-42, 483 P.2d at 573-74.
Likewise, in Forshee & Langley Logging v.
Peckham, 100 Or.App. 717, 788 P.2d 487 (1990), the
claimant was awarded temporary total disability
compensation prior to incarceration. Like King, the
claimant in Forshee was neither medically stabilized
nor released for regular work during the period of his
incarceration. In affirming the award of benefits, the
absence of legislation specifically terminating benefits
upon incarceration was significant to . the Forshee
court. "It is the legislature's province to restrict the
ability of incarcerated individuals to collect workers'
compensation and, in some situations, it has done so.
We decline employer's suggestion that we create
additional exceptions that have no basis in the statute."
Id. 788 P.2d at 488 (citation & footnote omitted).
Thus, the absence of a provision in the state's
workers' compensation statutes specifically denying
disability benefits to claimants during periods of
incarceration is a significant factor in the analysis of
many courts when awarding benefits to incarcerated
claimants.
(FN21)
As with numerous other
jurisdictions, Utah's Workers' Compensation *1295
Act has no provision terminating benefits because of a
claimant's incarceration.
[19] Omissions in the Workers' Compensation Act
are significant and the "statute should be applied
according to its literal wording." Traylor Bros., Inc./
Frunin-Colnon v. Overton, 736 P.2d 1048, 1052 (Utah
App. 1987). Significantly, as noted in their caselaw,
several states have enacted legislation which
specifically terminates workers' compensation benefits
after a claimant has been incarcerated. (FN22)
Furthermore, the Utah Legislature has chosen to
restrict workers' compensation benefits under certain
circumstances. For example, section 35-1-14 provides
for a fifteen percent reduction in compensation for an
employee's failure to use safety devices, failure to obey
employer's safety rule, or employee's intoxication. See
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-14 (1988). Similarly, section
35-1-45 suspends benefits when the accident was
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"purposely self-inflicted." Id. § 35-1-45. Thus, it is
clear the Utah Legislature knows how to limit workers'
compensation benefits, and does so when it so desires.
[20] [21] We therefore hold the absence of a statutory
provision limiting workers' compensation benefits upon
a claimant's incarceration mandates a conclusion that
temporary total benefits should be awarded to King.
Moreover, the Utah Workers' Compensation Act is
based on contract principles and an employee's right to
benefits arises when he suffers a work-related injury.
Absent an explicit statutory provision, the Industrial
Commission is not free to reduce statutorily-created
benefits. "The Industrial Commission is not free to
'legislate' in areas apparently overlooked by our
lawmakers or to exercise power not expressly or
impliedly granted to it by the legislature, even in the
name of fairness." Bevans v. Industrial Comm'n, 790
P.2d 573, 578 (Utah App. 1990).
In Utah, workers' compensation is the employee's
exclusive remedy against an employer for an industrial
injury, a fact which further supports an award of
benefits to King. See Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-60
(1988). Under our statutory scheme, King relinquished
his right to sue his employer for his industrial injury in
exchange for workers' compensation benefits. King's
incarceration would not have cost him the right to sue
his employer under the common law.
Absent
legislative action, that incarceration should not cost
him his right to workers' compensation.
The Workers' Compensation Fund contends Griffith
v. Industrial Commission, *1296 754 P.2d 981 (Utah
App. 1988), supports the denial of benefits in this case.
In Griffith, we affirmed a denial of benefits where the
claimant's disability was prolonged due to a delay in
corrective surgery for reasons unrelated to the
industrial accident.
However, the Industrial
Commission's reliance on Griffith is misplaced.
In Griffith, the claimant received temporary total
disability benefits for an industrial injury to his ankle.
An orthopedic surgeon evaluated his ankle and
recommended
surgical
reconstruction.
The
Commission concluded the healing period had ended
and the claimant's medical condition had stabilized.
An internist who evaluated the claimant's hypertension
and asthma advised that ankle surgery be postponed
until the hypertension and asthma were treated. The
Industrial Commission determined the employer was
not liable for temporary total disability for the period
which the claimant's hypertension and asthma had to be
controlled so surgery could be safely performed. The
Commission reasoned that surgical repair had to be
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delayed because of other medical problems, not for
further treatment of claimant's ankle. In affirming the
Commission's denial of temporary total disability, we
found "that the Commission's conclusion that plaintiffs
ankle injury had reached medical stability on May 2,
1985 ... [was] not arbitrary and capricious because ...
[it was] supported by substantial evidence on the
record." Id. at 984.
Unlike King, in Griffith the claimant's condition had
reached stabilization, a prerequisite for termination of
temporary total disability payments. See Booms v.
Rapp Constr. Co., 720 P.2d 1363, 1366 (Utah 1986).
Accord Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Wallace, 728 P.2d
1021, 1022 (Utah 1986);
Reddish v. Sentinel
Consumer Prod, 111 P.2d 1103, 1104 (Utah
App. 1989). In Griffith, workers' compensation benefits
were properly discontinued. Thus, Griffith provides no
support for the Industrial Commission's argument.
Counsel for the Workers' Compensation Fund also
suggests we should adopt a rule that as long as
circumstances which delay the claimant's surgery are
beyond the control of the insurer, the insurer should not
be required to pay temporary total disability
compensation. Such a rule, however, makes no sense.
It would permit the insurer to terminate benefits
whenever they deem the claimant's surgery to be
sufficiently "delayed," resulting in subjective and
arbitrary determinations. (FN23) Would the Industrial
Commission terminate benefits if King's surgery was
delayed only eight days instead of eight months?
Indeed, at oral argument counsel for the Industrial
Commission indicated that if King's disability had been
prolonged for a shorter period the Commission would
not have challenged the payment of disability benefits.
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I concur in the result. We have previously set forth
the proper standard of review *1297. for appeals from
the Industrial Commission's denial of compensation
under Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (1988) in Cross v.
Board of Review, 824 P.2d 1202, 1203-04 (Utah
App. 1992). At the time of that decision, the proper
post-UAPA standard of review for appeals under
section 35-1-45 was an issue of first impression in
Utah. In Cross, we determined that section 35-1-45
contained no express or implied grant of discretion to
the Industrial Commission. Id. at 1204. That decision
stands unchallenged as the correct law on the very
point raised in this case, and the majority expressly
acknowledges this in its opinion. Thus, in light of
Cross, and the doctrine of stare decisis as enunciated in
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1268-71 (Utah
1993), I find the majority's protracted examination of
the appropriate standard of review in this case
unwarranted.
(FN1.) That section provides:
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a
person seeking judicial review has been substantially
prejudiced by any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which
the agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its
face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction
conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues
requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied
the law;

CONCLUSION
Because Utah's Workers' Compensation statutes do
not have specific language limiting benefits for
incarcerated recipients of temporary total disability
payments, such benefits must be paid until the
claimant's medical condition has stabilized.
The
termination of benefits is a policy matter which must be
addressed by the Utah Legislature, not by this court or
by the Industrial Commission.
Accordingly, we
reverse the Industrial Commission's ruling and remand
this matter for determination of benefits.
GREENWOOD, J., concurring.
RUSSON, Associate Presiding Judge (concurring in
result):

(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure
or decision-making process, or has failed to follow
prescribed procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally
constituted as a decision-making body or were
subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination
of fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in
light of the whole record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency
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by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the
agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and
reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for
the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1989).
(FN2.) Cf. State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1267-71
(Utah 1993) (acknowledging supreme court's failure
to clearly articulate standards of review).
(FN3.) Opinion by Judge Billings with Judges Jackson
and Russon concurring.
(FN4.) Opinion by Judge Bench with Judge Garff
concurring and Judge Russon concurring in the result
only.
(FN5.) Prior to UAPA we reviewed agency
determinations under three distinct categories. While
the standards for factual determinations and
interpretations of general law remain the same, it is
this intermediate area of scrutiny that has changed.
Formerly
agency decisions involving mixed questions of law
and fact or the application of specific factual
situations to the legislative enactments under which
the agency operates were to be given deference by the
courts and were to be upheld so long as they fell
within the bounds of reasonableness and rationality.
Savage Indus., Inc. v. Tax Comm'n., 811 P.2d 664,
667 (Utah 1991). We spent far less time grappling
with the standard of review under this relatively
simple analysis. The complexities involved in the
new analysis seem not, in the end, to make a
significant enough difference for the amount of
energy we expend.
(FN6.) Appeals under the various subsections of
63-46b-16(4) are subject to various standards of
review. For example, in Union Pacific Railroad Co.
v. Tax Commission, 842 P.2d 876 (Utah 1992), the
railroad challenged some determinations of the Tax
Commission. One challenge was to a rule of the
Commission under section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(ii).
Citing a pre-UAPA case the court held that rules
promulgated by the agency and departures from those
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rules will be upheld if they are reasonable and
rational. Id. at 878-80. The court engaged in no
discussion of explicit or implicit grants of discretion.
The court also held the railroad's challenge to the
constitutionality of a sales tax under section
63-46b-16(4)(a) would be reviewed for correctness.
M a t 880-81.
Thus, Morton applies only when we are ascertaining
whether an appeals is brought under section
63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) or 63-46b-16(4)(d). See also
Nucor Corp. v. Tax Comm'n, 832 P.2d 1294 (Utah
1992) (noting review for abuse of agency discretion
was under section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i)); Anderson v.
Public Service Comm'n, 839 P.2d 822 (Utah 1992)
(noting review of claims that agency action was
arbitrary
and
capricious
under
section
63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv) is for reasonableness). Because
the standard of review under UAPA will vary based
on the subsection the claim is brought under, we
strongly encourage counsel to clearly identify under
what section review is being sought and to make
certain they identify the appropriate standard of
review under that section. Cf. Bhatia v. Department
of Employment Sec, 834 P.2d 574, 581-82 (Utah
App. 1992) (Bench, P.J., concurring) (encouraging
counsel to present an appropriate statutory
construction in UAPA cases).
*1297_ (FN7.) This conclusion that agency expertise
and experience remain appropriate considerations
when assessing whether to grant deference is
supported by Sanders Brine Shrimp v. Tax
Commission, 846 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1993) and Board
of Equalization v. Tax Commission, 846 P.2d 1292
(Utah 1993). In both cases, the supreme court cites a
pre-Morton non-UAPA case, Chris & Dick's Lumber
& Hardware v. Tax Commission, 791 P.2d 511 (Utah
1990), for the proposition that "[w]e give no
deference to an administrative agency's interpretation
of a statute absent certain circumstances, none of
which exist here." Sanders, at 1305; Board of
Equalization, at 1295-96.
The circumstances
referenced in Chris & Dick's are those instances
where the agency's expertise should be deferred to.
Chris & Dick's, 791 P.2d at 513-14.
Further, a footnote in Zissi v. Tax Commission, 842
P.2d 848 (Utah 1992), a post-Morton UAPA case,
also supports this conclusion. In that footnote the
supreme court rejects applying an intermediate
standard of review based in part on the rationale that
"the issues are questions of constitutional law and
statutory construction on which the Commission's
experience and expertise will be of no real
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assistance." Id. at 860 n. 2. The Zissi footnote relies
on Silver v. Tax Commission, 820 P.2d 912 (Utah
1991), and Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d
212 (Utah 1992), to support this proposition. Silver
is a pre-UAPA case and Sandy City did not involve
an agency of the state, thus, UAPA would not apply
even if that case arose today.
Sanders, Board of Equalization, and Zissi all indicate
agency experience and expertise are still relevant
considerations in deciding whether there is a grant of
discretion in cases arising under UAPA.
(FN8.) Opinion by Judge Jackson with Judges Garff
and Greenwood concurring.
(FN9.) Opinion by Judge Billings with Judges Jackson
and Russon concurring.
(FN 10.) Judge Bench has expressed a concern that
what we did in Putvin was find an explicit grant of
discretion to the Tax Commission by virtue of Utah
Code Ann. § 59-12-118 (1992). See Belnorth
Petroleum Corp. v. Tax Comm'n, 845 P.2d 266,
268-69 n. 5 (Utah App. 1993). We agree the
discretion we found in Putvin is better characterized
as an implicit grant under Morton.
(FN11.) Opinion by Judge Russon with Judges
Jackson and Orme concurring.
(FN 12.) Opinion by Judge Orme with Judges Jackson
and Russon concurring.
(FN 13.) Opinion by Judge Billings with Judge Garff
concurring and Judge Bench concurring with opinion.
(FN14.) Opinion by Judge Garff
Greenwood and Russon concurring.

with Judges

(FN 15.) Creative counsel might read Judge Bench's
dissent in Luckau v. Board of Review, 840 P.2d 811
(Utah App. 1992) and his concurrence in Bhatia as
indicating we must look to see if the statute is
unambiguous before we look for an explicit grant of
discretion. See Luckau, 840 P.2d at 817 (Bench, P.J.,
dissenting); Bhatia, 834 P.2d at 581 n. 4 (Bench,
P.J., concurring).
The Luckau dissent cites language from Ferro v.
Department of Commerce, 828 P.2d 507 (Utah
App. 1992) regarding implicit grants of discretion in
its assertion that ambiguity is the first step. See
Luckau, 840 P.2d at 817 (Bench, P.J., dissenting). In
Ferro, the language cited in Luckau came after Judge
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Bench's discussion of explicit grants of discretion and
before his discussion of implicit grants of discretion.
See Ferro, 828 P.2d at 510. The Bhatia footnote
cites Mor-Flo Industries, Inc. v. Board of Review,
817 P.2d 328 (Utah App. 1991) to support the
assertion:
"We may not defer to an agency's
interpretation until we know the legislature itself did
not render
its own discernable
statutory
interpretation." Bhatia, 834 P.2d at 581 n. 4 (Bench,
P.J., concurring). While this language could be
interpreted as requiring an assessment of ambiguity
first, it does not appear to be what was intended. If
we followed that analysis, we would attempt to
interpret the statute whether there was a grant of
discretion to the agency or not.
Thus, we believe there is agreement that the court's
first task is to look for an explicit grant of discretion.
If we were to ignore an explicit grant of discretion
and apply a plain language test first, we would ignore
the legislature's intent to grant the agency discretion.
Therefore, counsel should not read Luckau, Bhatia,
and Mor-Flo as requiring this court to assess
ambiguity prior to assessing whether a grant of
discretion exists.
*1297_ (FN16.) Opinion by Judge Bench with Judge
Russon concurring and Judge Billings concurring in
the result only.
(FN 17.) See also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Tax Comm'n,
847 P.2d 418, 420, n. 6 (Utah App. 1993) (Opinion
by Bench, J.;
Garff, J., concurring; Russon, J.,
concurring in the result) (finding no explicit grant
under Judge Bench's definition); Belnorth Petroleum
Corp. v. Tax Comm'n, 845 P.2d 266, 267-69 (Utah
App. 1993) (Opinion by Bench, J.;
Garff and
Russon, JJ., concurring) (same).
(FN 18.) We note, as the court did in Morton, the ways
we articulate of finding a legislative grant of
discretion are not exhaustive. In the appropriate
circumstances we could find a grant of discretion via
an analysis yet unarticulated. See Morton, 814 P.2d
at 589 (noting other methods of finding deference
might arise).
(FN19.) See, e.g., United Riggers Erectors v.
Industrial Comm'n, 131 Ariz. 258, 640 P.2d 189
(App. 1981) (awarding benefits because incarceration
was not voluntary removal from job market and there
was no legislation taking away these benefits);
Bearden v. Industrial Comm'n, 14 Ariz.App. 336,
483 P.2d 568 (1971) (holding right to workers'
compensation not forfeited during incarceration if
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sentence less than life because no statute so provides
and this is an issue which should be determined by
the legislature); Crawford v. Midwest Steel Co., 517
So.2d 918 (La.App.1987) (holding claimant entitled
to benefits despite incarceration because statute does
not provide otherwise);
DeMars v. Roadway
Express, Inc., 99 Mich.App. 842, 298 N.W.2d 645,
647 (1980) (affirming total disability compensation
despite felony conviction because denial of benefits
under such a situation "is not the province of the
Board or the judicial branch"); Forshee & Langley
Logging v. Peckham, 100 Or.App. 717, 788 P.2d 487
(1990) (holding claimant entitled to temporary total
disability during incarceration because he was never
medically stationary nor released for work during
incarceration); Last v. MSI Constr. Co., 305 S.C.
349, 409 S.E.2d 334 (1991) (awarding incarcerated
claimant temporary total disability benefits); In re
Spera, 713 P.2d 1155 (Wyo.1986) (holding under
contract principles incarcerated claimant should not
be denied temporary total benefits, which under the
statute terminate only when the worker recovers and
regains his earning power). But see State ex rel.
Grennan v. Barry, 71 Ohio App.3d 385, 594 N.E.2d
51 (1991) (holding employee not entitled to
compensation during period of incarceration); State
ex rel. Ashcraft v. Industrial Comm'n, 34 Ohio St.3d
42, 517 N.E.2d 533 (1987) (denying temporary total
disability compensation because incarceration was
"voluntary" act removing claimant from work force).
(FN20.) Similarly, the ALJ denied King benefits on
the basis his incarceration was an intervening cause.
(FN21.) The absence of specific legislation providing
for suspension of workers' compensation benefits
upon a claimant's incarceration is a significant factor
to courts from other jurisdictions awarding benefits to
temporarily disabled incarcerated claimants. See
Bearden, 14 Ariz.App. at 341-42, 483 P.2d at 573-74
(deciding terminating temporary total benefits was
matter of public policy which should be determined
by legislature); Forshee, 788 P.2d at 488 (reasoning
legislature's province to restrict ability of incarcerated
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individuals to collect workers' compensation); In re
Spera, 713 P.2d 1155 (Wyo.1986) (holding
determination of when payments should be suspended
is matter that should be left to legislature).
Likewise, the absence of legislation providing for
suspension of workers' compensation benefits during
incarceration is also important in the analysis of
courts which awarded benefits to permanently
disabled claimants who were incarcerated.
See
United Riggers, 640 P.2d at 193 (awarding benefits
because incarceration was not voluntary removal
from job market and there was no legislation taking
away these benefits); Crawford v. Midwest Steel Co.,
517 So.2d 918 (La.App.1987) (holding claimant
entitled to benefits despite incarceration because
statute does not provide otherwise). See also
DeMars, 298 N.W.2d at 647 (affirming total
disability compensation despite felony conviction
because denial of benefits under such a situation "is
not the province of the Board or the judicial branch").
But see Packard v. Donald Sperry & Sons, 331
N.Y.S.2d 126, 39 A.D.2d 622 (N.Y.App.Div.1972)
(holding claimant not entitled to compensation during
incarceration); White v. Industrial Comm'n, No.
L-92-040, 1992 WL 348158 (Ohio App. Nov. 27,
1992) (suspending permanent total disability benefits
because incarceration amounted to a voluntary
abandonment of work).
*1297__ (FN22.) See, e.g., White v. Industrial Comm'n,
No. L-92-040, 1992 WL 348158 (Ohio App. Nov.
27, 1992); Wood v. Beatrice Foods Co., 813 P.2d
821 (Colo.App.1991); Jones v. Department of
Corrections, 185 Mich.App. 65, 460 N.W.2d 229
(1990).
(FN23.) For example, under such a rule, an insurer
could terminate a claimant's temporary total disability
compensation if only one surgeon had the skill to
perform corrective surgery but was unable to
schedule surgery for three months or was unavailable
because he was called to active service as a member
of the military reserves.
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Pagel

413IX(B) Compensation for Disability
413IX(B)2 Total Incapacity
413k847 Incapacity for Work or Employment
Generally.

*150 918P.2dl50
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Warren HOSKINGS, Petitioner,
v.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH and Salt
Lake City
Corporation, Respondents.
No. 950236-CA.
May 31,1996.
Certiorari Denied Oct. 17, 1996.
Claim for workers' compensation benefits was filed.
Industrial Commission reversed administrative law
judge's (ALJ) award of permanent total disability
benefits. Claimant sought judicial review. The Court
of Appeals, Orme, P.J., held that: (1) Commission's
finding, under odd lot doctrine, that claimant could be
rehabilitated was not supported by residuum of
nonhearsay evidence, and (2) employer failed to meet
its burden, under odd lot doctrine, of proving existence
of regular, steady work that claimant could perform.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
Billings, J., concurred in result.

[See headnote text below]
[3] Workers' Compensation <@^ 1375
413 —
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(L) Presumptions and Burden of Proof
413XVI(L)2 Particular Matters
413kl373 Amount and Period of Compensation
413kl375 Extent and Duration of Injury or
Disability.
In workers' compensation proceeding, finding of
permanent total disability under odd lot doctrine
requires following: (1) employee must prove that he or
she cannot perform duties required in his or her
occupation, (2) after being referred to Division of
Rehabilitation
Services
(DRS) by
Industrial
Commission, employee, with assistance of DRS, must
prove that he or she cannot be rehabilitated, (3) if
employee meets first two requirements, burden then
shifts to employer to prove existence of regular, steady
work employee can nonetheless perform, taking into
account such factors as employee's age, mental
capacity, and education.

West Headnotes
[1] Workers' Compensation <§==> 1820
413 —
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(S) Review by Board or Commission
413kl820 Questions of Law or Fact and Findings.
Although administrative law judge (ALJ) initially
hears evidence, Industrial Commission is ultimate fact
finder in workers' compensation proceeding.
[2] Workers' Compensation <§=> 847
413 —
413IX Amount and Period of Compensation
413IX(B) Compensation for Disability
413IX(B)2 Total Incapacity
413k847 Incapacity for Work or Employment
Generally.
Under "odd lot doctrine," Industrial Commission may
find permanent total disability when relatively small
percentage of impairment caused by industrial accident
is combined with other factors to render workers'
compensation claimant unable to obtain suitable
employment.
[3] Workers' Compensation <®=:=>847
413 —
4 BIX Amount and Period of Compensation

[4] Workers' Compensation <®^> 1639
413 —
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(N) Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence
413XVI(N)9 Amount and Period of Compensation
413k 163 5 Compensation for Total Disability in
General
413kl639 Permanent Disability.
In meeting its burden under odd lot doctrine, for
purposes of avoiding finding of permanent total
disability in workers' compensation proceeding, it is
insufficient for employer to simply show that employee
is generally capable of performing some type of work;
rather, in order to prove existence of regular and steady
work employee can perform, employer must prove that
regular, dependable work is available to employee.
[5] Workers' Compensation <©=> 1639
413 —
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(N) Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence
413XVI(N)9 Amount and Period of Compensation
413kl635 Compensation for Total Disability in
General
413kl639 Permanent Disability.
In order to prove existence of regular and steady
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work employee can perform, for purposes of satisfying
its burden under odd lot doctrine and thereby avoiding
finding of permanent total disability in workers'
compensation proceeding, employer must introduce
evidence of actual job within reasonable distance from
employee's home which he or she is able to perform or
for which he or she can be trained, and employer must
also show that employee has reasonable opportunity to
be employed at that job.
[6] Workers' Compensation <@=* 1385
413 —
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(M) Admissibility of Evidence
413kl385 Hearsay.
Hearsay evidence, even if objected to, is admissible
in
administrative
hearing
before
Industrial
Commission; however, Commission's findings of fact
cannot be based exclusively on hearsay evidence.
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-88.
[7] Workers' Compensation <®^ 1939.4(3)
413 -—
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(T) Review by Court
413XVI(T)12A Questions of Law or Fact,
Findings, and Verdict
413kl939 Review of Decision of Department,
Commission,
Board,
Officer,
or
Arbitrator
413kl939.4 Sufficiency of Evidence in Support
413kl939.4(3) Competent Evidence.
To support Industrial Commission's findings in
workers' compensation proceeding, under residuum
rule, there must be residuum of evidence, legal and
competent in court of law.
[8] Administrative Law and Procedure <@=>462
15A—15AIV Powers and Proceedings of Administrative
Agencies, Officers and Agents
15AIV(D) Hearings and Adjudications
15Ak458 Evidence
15Ak462 Weight and Sufficiency.
Residuum rule requires that each finding of fact made
by administrative agency be supported by residuum of
legally competent evidence.
[9] Workers'Compensation <©=> 1385
413 —413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(M) Admissibility of Evidence
413kl385 Hearsay.
[See headnote text below]
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[9] Workers' Compensation © ^ 1639
413 —
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(N) Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence
413XVI(N)9 Amount and Period of Compensation
413k 163 5 Compensation for Total Disability in
General
413kl639 Permanent Disability.
Report prepared by private rehabilitation firm
concerning whether workers' compensation claimant
could be rehabilitated was hearsay evidence, and
therefore, under residuum rule, could not form sole
basis for Industrial Commission's factual finding
regarding claimant's potential for rehabilitation, where
author of report never testified at hearing before
administrative law judge (ALJ) or Industrial
Commission. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-67 (Repealed); Rules
ofEvid., Rule 801.
[10] Workers' Compensation <®=>1639
413 —
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(N) Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence
413XVI(N)9 Amount and Period of Compensation
413kl635 Compensation for Total Disability in
General
413k 163 9 Permanent Disability.
Industrial Commission's finding, under odd lot
doctrine, that workers' compensation claimant, a
former city firefighter, could be rehabilitated was not
supported by residuum of nonhearsay evidence, where
only supporting nonhearsay evidence was that claimant
had been able to work for few months during two
summers as fire marshall in national park located
hundreds of miles away from claimant's permanent
residence.
Industrial Commission.
U.C.A.1953,
35-1-67 (Repealed).
[ 11 ] Workers' Compensation <&* 1791
413— 413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(Q) Award or Judgment
413kl788 Conclusiveness and Effect
413kl791 Matters Concluded.
Under former workers' compensation statute
governing award of permanent total disability benefits,
once Division of Rehabilitation Services (DRS)
certified to Industrial Commission *150 in writing
that claimant could not be rehabilitated, Commission
was unable to revisit issue of rehabilitation or consider
other evidence regarding claimant's rehabilitation.
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-67 (Repealed).
[ 12] Workers' Compensation <©=> 1639
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413 —
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(N) Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence
413XVI(N)9 Amount and Period of Compensation
413k 1635 Compensation for Total Disability in
General
413kl639 Permanent Disability.
For purposes of determining whether workers'
compensation claimant suffered permanent total
disability, employer failed to meet its burden, under
odd lot doctrine, of proving existence of regular, steady
work that claimant could perform, though report
prepared by private rehabilitation firm identified
several job titles which existed in region of claimant's
residence, as there was no evidence in report that such
jobs were actually available to claimant or that
claimant had reasonable opportunity to be employed in
such jobs.
i

[13] Workers' Compensation <®=> 1639
413 —
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(N) Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence
413XVI(N)9 Amount and Period of Compensation
413k 163 5 Compensation for Total Disability in
General
413kl639 Permanent Disability.
In order to sustain its burden under odd lot doctrine,
for purposes of avoiding finding of permanent total
disability, employer must prove that actual job is
regularly and continuously available to workers'
compensation applicant, within reasonable proximity of
his or her usual residence or residences, and that
applicant has reasonable opportunity to be employed in
particular job.
*152 James R. Black, Salt Lake City, for Petitioner.
Alan L. Hennebold, Frank Nakamura, and Erie V.
Boorman, Salt Lake City, for Respondents.
Before ORME, DAVIS and BILLINGS, JJ.
OPINION
ORME, Presiding Judge:
Petitioner Warren Hoskings seeks review of an
Industrial Commission order that overturned an
administrative law judge's decision granting him
permanent total disability benefits. We reverse the
Commission's order and remand with instructions to
reinstate the administrative law judge's decision.
FACTS
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[1] We recite the facts as found by the Commission.
(FN1) In 1966, Hoskings began work as a fireman for
Salt Lake City Corporation. He was promoted to
lieutenant in 1974, and then to captain in the early
1980's.
In 1980, Hoskings injured Ms left ankle while
fighting a fire. As a result of this injury, he underwent
surgery but continued to experience pain. In April
1986, Hoskings reinjured his left ankle in the course of
his employment. The next day, he sought medical
attention and was diagnosed with an acute left ankle
sprain and calcaneous/cuboid joint problem. He was
later diagnosed with the additional condition of
traumatic osteoarthritis.
Hoskings did not miss any time from work as a result
of this injury.
However, after the injury, he
experienced chronic pain and difficulty in walking.
Various physicians examined him and attempted to
treat his injuries with conservative remedies. However,
none of these treatments produced any significant
improvement in Hoskings's left ankle.
In 1988, Hoskings took early retirement from Salt
Lake City Corporation, apparently to take advantage of
an attractive early retirement package. At the time of
his retirement, Hoskings did not inform Salt Lake City
Corporation that his decision to retire was related in
any manner to his left ankle injury. However, he
testified before an administrative law judge in this
proceeding that his injury did contribute to his decision
to retire early. There is no evidence that his work
performance was unsatisfactory prior to his retirement.
During the summers of 1990 and 1991, after his
retirement, Hoskings worked for Hamilton Stores as a
fire marshall in Yellowstone National Park.
A
significant portion of his work day consisted of driving
in a vehicle from one store to another, making
inspections and teaching fire safety procedures.
Hoskings reported no difficulties in performing the
duties of this job. However, when the job was changed
to a year-round position, he chose to resign because he
believed the cold winter temperatures might aggravate
his ankle pain.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION PROCEEDINGS
In 1990, Hoskings filed an Application for Hearing
with the Industrial Commission. In his Application for
Hearing, he claimed that Salt Lake City Corporation
had refused to *153 pay him medical expenses,
temporary total disability benefits, permanent partial
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disability benefits, and permanent total disability
benefits due him by reason of his ankle injury. An
evidentiary hearing before an administrative law judge
was held on January 8, 1992. After the hearing, the
ALJ referred the matter to a medical panel. The
medical panel found that Hoskings's foremost
orthopedic problem was the calcaneus/cuboid arthritis
of his left ankle. The medical panel opined that the
origin of this problem was definitely industrial and that
it had worsened since the 1986 industrial accident.
The ALJ then made a tentative finding of permanent
total disability and, as required by statute, referred the
case to the Division of Rehabilitation Services (DRS)
for an evaluation of Hoskings's susceptibility to
rehabilitation. (FN2) According to the testimony of
Frank Miera, the rehabilitation counselor assigned to
evaluate Hoskings's case, DRS performed a one-week
work evaluation during November 1992. Mr. Miera
testified that Hoskings fully cooperated with the DRS
during the evaluation and was very truthful and honest
about his condition throughout the process. The
evaluation was conducted by DRS rehabilitation
counselors trained to administer such evaluations. Mr.
Miera testified that in the regular course of his work as
a DRS rehabilitation counselor, he refers applicants to
trained DRS personnel and relies on their written
reports in assessing an applicant's potential for
rehabilitation.
After the evaluation, Mr. Miera
requested Hoskings to update him periodically on his
condition. Mr. Miera testified that Hoskings did
update him on his condition and reported that he was
having the same problems with his left ankle. Mr.
Miera concluded that it was not feasible for Hoskings
to enter into a rehabilitation program.
Salt Lake City Corporation then requested that
Hoskings undergo a vocational evaluation to be
performed by Intracorp, a private rehabilitation firm,
which evaluation was completed during December
1993. Salt Lake City Corporation submitted the
Intracorp report to the ALJ.
The Intracorp report concluded that Hoskings could
be rehabilitated. The Intracorp evaluator, Jim Floyd,
found that Hoskings demonstrated the capacity to learn
and would be successful in formal training to prepare
for more challenging and higher paying jobs. In his
report, Mr. Floyd noted that Hoskings had improved
physical stamina and that DRS's finding of poor
physical stamina was no longer accurate. In addition,
Mr. Floyd identified several jobs that Hoskings would
qualify for given some limited training or schooling.
Finally, the Intracorp report identified the regions of
Utah that would provide the greatest opportunity for
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employment in the identified jobs.
After receiving the DRS letter, Miera's testimony, and
the Intracorp report, the ALJ entered her Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. Applying the
"odd lot" doctrine, the ALJ first found that Hoskings
had met his burden of proving that the 1986 industrial
accident caused his ankle injury and that he could not
return to work as a fire fighter. Next, the ALJ found
that Hoskings met his burden of proving he could not
be rehabilitated. The ALJ then concluded that Salt
Lake City Corporation had not met its burden to show
that regular steady work was nonetheless available to
Hoskings. Accordingly, the ALJ held that Hoskings
was entitled to an award of permanent total disability
benefits.
Salt Lake City Corporation filed a Motion for Review
with the Commission.
The Commission *154
reversed the ALJ's decision and held that Hoskings was
not entitled to permanent total disability benefits. In
reaching its decision, the Commission found that
Hoskings could be rehabilitated and that regular,
dependable employment was available to him in other
branches of the labor market.
On appeal, Hoskings argues that the Commission
misinterpreted the "odd lot" doctrine by failing to
apply the correct burdens of proof to the evidence
introduced by the parties. In addition, he argues that
the Commission's findings are not supported by
competent legal evidence. Before turning to the
specific claims, we review the legal principles
applicable to this case, i.e., the "odd lot" doctrine and
the residuum rule.
"ODD LOT" DOCTRINE
[2][3] Under the "odd lot" doctrine, (FN3) the
Commission may find permanent total disability when
a relatively small percentage of impairment caused by
an industrial accident is combined with other factors to
render the claimant unable to obtain suitable
employment. See Hardman v. Salt Lake City Fleet
Mgmt., 725 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Utah 1986); Marshall v.
Industrial Comm'n, 681 P.2d 208, 212 (Utah 1984). A
finding of permanent total disability under the odd lot
doctrine requires the following: (1) the employee must
prove that he or she cannot perform the duties required
in his or her occupation; (2) after being referred to the
Division of Rehabilitation Services by the Industrial
Commission, the employee, with the assistance of the
DRS, must prove that he or she cannot be rehabilitated;
(3) if the employee meets the first two requirements,
the burden then shifts to the employer to prove the
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existence of regular, steady work the employee can
nonetheless perform, taking into account such factors
as the employee's age, mental capacity, and education.
Hardman, 725 P.2d at 1326-27.
[4] [5] In meeting its burden, it is insufficient for the
employer to simply show that the employee is generally
capable of performing some type of work. Rather, in
order to prove the existence of regular and steady work
the employee can perform, the employer must prove
that "regular, dependable work [is] available " to the
employee. Marshall, 681 P.2d at 212 (emphasis
added). This requires the employer to introduce
evidence of "an actual job within a reasonable distance
from [the employee's] home which he is able to
perform or for which he can be trained." Lyons v.
Industrial Special Indent. Fund, 98 Idaho 403, 407,
565 P.2d 1360, 1364 (1977) (construing Idaho statute).
See ARA Servs., Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 226
Ill.App.3d 225, 168 Ill.Dec. 756, 761-62, 590 N.E.2d
78, 83-84 (1992) (holding burden shifts to employer to
show some kind of suitable work is available to
claimant); Durbin v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 558
So.2d 1257, 1260 (La.App.1990) (requiring employer
to prove some form of gainful occupation is regularly
and continuously available to employee within
reasonable proximity of his residence). Moreover, the
employer must also show that the employee "has a
reasonable opportunity to be employed at that job."
Lyons, 565 P.2d at 1364. (FN4)
*155 RESIDUUM RULE
[6][7] Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-88 (1994) provides
that "[n]either the Commission nor its hearing
examiner shall be bound by the usual common-law or
statutory rules of evidence."
Therefore, hearsay
evidence, even if objected to, is admissible in an
administrative hearing before the Commission.
Industrial Power Contractors v. Industrial Comm'n,
832 P.2d 477, 478 (Utah App.1992). However, the
Commission's findings of fact "cannot be based
exclusively on hearsay evidence." Yacht Club v. Utah
Liquor Control Comm'n, 681 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Utah
1984) (emphasis in original).
To support the
Commission's findings, "there must be a residuum of
evidence, legal and competent in a court of law."
Hackford v. Industrial Comm'n, 11 Utah 2d 312, 315,
358 P.2d 899, 901 (1961).
[8] The residuum rule requires that each finding of
fact made by an administrative agency be supported by
a residuum of legally competent evidence. See Yacht
Club, 681 P.2d at 1227; Industrial Power, 832 P.2d at
479; Wagstaffv. Department of Employment Sec, 826
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P.2d 1069, 1072 (Utah App.1992); Tolman v. Salt
Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 32-33 (Utah
App. 1991). For example, in Wagstaff, a former Air
Force civilian employee, discharged for drug use,
challenged a decision of the Board of Review of the
Industrial Commission denying him unemployment
compensation benefits. The employee claimed that
since the Air Force disciplinary regulations in effect at
the time of his drug use did not sanction discharge for
first-time drug offenders, he was not terminated for just
cause. 826 P.2d at 1070-71.
In evaluating whether the employee was discharged
for just cause, the Commission made a factual finding
that he had used cocaine during Iris lunch break on one
occasion. Id. at 1072. The Commission based its
finding on an internal Air Force investigation report, as
well as on the employee's own admission in testimony
to the one-time drug use. Id. at 1071. The report
contained the employee's admission to the one-time
drug use, obtained in the course of investigation, as
well as his coworkers' statements concerning the
incident. Id. However, the report also contained
statements from co-workers regarding the employee's
drug use on other occasions. Id. In finding that the
employee had engaged in drug use on one occasion, the
Commission also made reference to the fact that the
majority of the Board was not entirely persuaded that
he had used drugs only on the one occasion. Id. at
1072 n. 3.
This court held that the Commission's finding of a
single incident of drug use was supported by the
employee's own admissions, and thus was supported by
a residuum of competent, non-hearsay evidence. Id. at
1072.
See Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(2). However,
although no actual finding of additional drug use was
made by the Commission, this court was concerned that
even the subtle reference to additional drug use
contained in the Commission's written opinion, which
could only be supported by the co-workers' hearsay
statements not buttressed by a residuum of competent
legal evidence, tainted its decision. Id. Therefore, in
reviewing whether the employee's termination was for
just cause, we evaluated the Board's decision solely
with reference to the employee's single admitted
instance of drug use. Id.
Similarly, in this case, we must determine whether the
Commission's findings of fact regarding rehabilitation
and job availability are supported by a residuum of
competent, nonhearsay evidence. If the Commission's
findings of fact are not supported by a residuum of
such evidence, Hoskings is entitled to appropriate
relief.
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ANALYSIS
Under the odd lot doctrine, as explained above, the
employee has the initial burden to prove he or she
cannot perform the duties required in his or her
occupation and that he or she cannot be rehabilitated.
If the employee fails in meeting these burdens, the
employer's burden to prove the existence of actual
work the employee can perform is not *156 triggered
and we need not evaluate whether that burden was
actually met.
In its order, the Commission reversed the ALJ's
decision and found that Hoskings could be
rehabilitated.
Therefore, we first review the
Commission's finding regarding Hoskings's potential
for rehabilitation. (FN5)
A. Rehabilitation
[9] [10] In finding that Hoskings could be
rehabilitated, the Commission relied on the conclusion
to that effect in the Intracorp report. However, this
report clearly meets the definition of hearsay under
Rule 801, Utah Rules of Evidence. (FN6) The author
of the report, Jim Floyd, never testified at a hearing
before the ALJ or the Commission.
Therefore,
although the Intracorp report was admissible in the
Commission's proceedings, it could not form the sole
basis for the Commission's factual finding regarding
Hoskings's potential for rehabilitation. Consequently,
the Commission's factual finding that Hoskings could
be rehabilitated cannot be sustained unless there is
some other, non-hearsay evidence to support it.
In its order, the Commission stated that "Inrracorp's
conclusion [regarding rehabilitation] is corroborated by
the fact that Hoskings found other work at Hamilton
Stores and successfully performed his employment
duties there." Salt Lake City Corporation argues that
this fact supports the Commission's decision and
provides the requisite residuum of competent legal
evidence. However, this fact is essentially irrelevant to
the issue of whether Hoskings could be rehabilitated
into a well-known branch of the labor market.
Hoskings testified at the evidentiary hearing that
Hamilton Stores was seeking someone to work year
round, including the winter months. Hoskings testified
he was unable to work during the winter months
because he could not stand the pain in his foot and
ankle caused by the cold weather. Salt Lake City
Corporation presented no contradicting evidence on
this point. The mere fact that Hoskings was able to
work for a few months during the summers of 1990 and
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1991 as a fire marshall in Yellowstone National Park,
hundreds of miles from Salt Lake City and his
permanent residences in Ivins and Vernal, Utah, does
not support a finding that he can be successfully
rehabilitated into any well-known branch of the labor
market. (FN7)
[11] Although we base our decision regarding
rehabilitation on the residuum rule, which the parties
have addressed in their briefs, there is an additional
basis on which our decision could be premised. The
applicable law regarding permanent total disability at
the time of Hoskings's April 16, 1986, injury read, in
pertinent part, as follows:
If the employee has tentatively been found to be
permanently and totally disabled, it shall be
mandatory that the industrial commission of Utah
refer the employee to the [Division of Rehabilitation
Services] for rehabilitation training.... If the division
... certifies to the industrial commission of.Utah in
writing that the employee has fully cooperated with
the division ... in its efforts to rehabilitate him, and in
the opinion of the division the employee may not be
rehabilitated, the commission shall order that there be
paid to the employee weekly benefits....
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (1974)(repealed 1988
Utah Laws, ch.116, § 4) (emphasis added). *157 A
plain reading of this statute suggests the determination
of rehabilitation is vested in DRS, with no discretion
left with the Commission to revisit the question and
decide it anew. Therefore, it would appear that once
DRS certified to the Commission in writing that
Hoskings could not be rehabilitated, all inquiry into the
issue of rehabilitation—a question delegated by the
Legislature not to the Commission, but to DRS~should
have ended. As we read the statute, the Commission
was unable to revisit the issue of rehabilitation or to
consider other evidence, such as the Intracorp report
presented by Salt Lake City Corporation. (FN8)
B. Job Availability
Once it is determined that an employee cannot be
rehabilitated-and such is the conclusion that must be
drawn about Hoskings on the record before us~the
burden then shifts to the employer to prove,
notwithstanding the employee's general inability to be
rehabilitated, the "existence of regular, steady work the
employee can perform, taking into account such factors
as the employee's age, mental capacity and education."
Hardman v. Salt Lake City Fleet MgmL, 725 P.2d
1323, 1326-27 (Utah 1986). However, as indicated
above, the employer must introduce evidence of "an
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actual job within a reasonable distance from [the
employee's] home which he is able to perform or for
which he can be trained." Lyons v. Industrial Special
Indem. Fund, 98 Idaho 403, 407, 565 P.2d 1360, 1364
(1977). In addition, the employer must also show that
the employee "has a reasonable opportunity to be
employed at that job." Id.
[12] In this case, the Commission relied exclusively
on the Intracorp report to find that regular, dependable
work was available to Hoskings. However, and totally
aside from residuum rule concerns, a review of the
substance of the Intracorp report reveals that it fails to
prove that an actual job was available to Hoskings.
Moreover, the Intracorp report fails to provide any
analysis regarding whether or not Hoskings had a
reasonable opportunity to be employed at any
particular job, due regard being had for his age, mental
capacity, and education.
In assessing Hoskings's employability, Mr. Floyd, the
author of the Intracorp report, ran three computer
searches and two manual searches. In the first
computer search, for occupations with skills that are
directly transferrable from those of a firefighter, only
one occupation emerged: surveillance-system monitor.
The second computer search revealed three
occupations that Hoskings could allegedly perform
given some limited schooling or short term training.
Finally, a third computer search was conducted which
considered less closely related occupations using the
same tools and machinery that Hoskings had used in
his previous jobs. Two job titles emerged from this
final computer search.
After the computer searches were finished, the report
indicates that two manual searches were conducted.
The first search considered Hoskings's entire work
history, including his military experience. In this
search, three occupations emerged. Finally, using the
Utah Department of Employment Security publication,
"Occupations in Demand," for the period of JanuaryJune, 1993, four job titles were identified.
Although the searches contained in the report
identified several job titles that existed *158. in the
Wasatch Front region, no evidence shows that these
jobs were actually available to Hoskings. First,
nowhere in the report is there a meaningful discussion
of the duties required in the occupations described.
The report lacks any analysis of whether Hoskings
could actually perform the duties required in these
occupations given his disabilities. Furthermore, the
report fails to show that these particular occupations
are actually available, i.e., that the demand for such
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jobs has not been fully met by the workforce.
Moreover, no evidence is contained in the report that
would indicate Hoskings himself had a reasonable
opportunity to be employed in these jobs, i.e.,
assuming some of these positions are available in
general, what is the realistic prospect that an employer
will choose a man in his mid-fifties with a bad ankle
and other health problems to fill one of them?
[13] Although the report claims to have considered
"job availability" in the computer searches, no
discussion as to what is meant by this term is contained
in the report. In describing the second manual search,
the report alleges that the four occupations found are
"reasonably available in southwestern or northeastern
regions of Utah." However, the report contains no
evidence that these particular jobs are actually
available to a person with the same disabilities as
Hoskings.
It is insufficient for Salt Lake City
Corporation to allege that a particular occupation is
generally available to the public at large, without
providing further evidence that the particular
occupation is actually available to Hoskings. In other
words, in order to sustain its burden under the odd lot
doctrine, an employer must prove that an actual job is
regularly and continuously available to the applicant,
within a reasonable proximity of his or her usual
residence or residences, and that the applicant has a
reasonable opportunity to be employed in the particular
job. (FN9)
Although we conclude that Salt Lake City
Corporation failed in a more general way to meet its
burden in this regard under the odd lot doctrine, we
also conclude that the Commission's finding as to job
availability was, at a more technical level, not based on
a residuum of competent legal evidence.
The Commission based its finding that other work
was available to Hoskings exclusively on the Intracorp
report. However, as we indicated above, the Intracorp
report is hearsay. Thus, although this report was
admissible during the administrative proceedings held
before the Commission, it cannot be the sole basis for
the Commission's finding. Rather, the Commission
must base its findings on legally competent evidence~a
finding cannot be based solely on hearsay.
CONCLUSION
In view of the statute regarding permanent total
disability in effect at the time of Hoskings's injury, it
may have been improper for the Commission to
consider the Intracorp report on the issue of
rehabilitation. If not, the Commission nonetheless
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erred, given the residuum rule, in finding that Hoskings
could be rehabilitated.
Further, Salt Lake City
Corporation failed to sustain its burden under the odd
lot doctrine to prove the existence of a regular, steady
job that was actually available to Hoskings.
Alternatively, in light of the residuum rule, the
Commission erred in finding that Salt Lake City
Corporation had met this burden.
Accordingly, we reverse the Commission's order and
remand with instructions to reinstate the administrative
law judge's decision.
DAVIS, Associate P.J., concurs.

Page 8

the capacities for work left to him fit him only for
special uses and do not, so to speak, make his powers
of labour a merchantable article in some of the well
known lines of the labour market, I think it is
incumbent upon the employer to sh[o]w that such
special employment can in fact be obtained by him.
If I might be allowed to use such an undignified
phrase, I should say that if the accident leaves the
workman's labour in the position of an "odd lot" in
the labour market, the employer must sh[o]w that a
customer can be found who will take it.
Id. at 1020-21 (quoted in 1C Arthur Larson & Lex K.
Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation §
57.51(b), at 10-330 (1995)).

BILLINGS, J., concurs in result.
(FN1.) Although an administrative law judge initially
hears the evidence, the Commission is the ultimate
fact finder. Virgin v. Board of Review, 803 P.2d
1284, 1287 (Utah App.1990).
(FN2.) The applicable law regarding permanent total
disability, in effect at the time of Hoskings's second
injury, read, in pertinent part, as follows:
If the employee has tentatively been found to be
permanently and totally disabled, it shall be
mandatory that the industrial commission of Utah
refer the employee to the division of vocational
rehabilitation [since renamed the Division of
Rehabilitation Services] under the state board of
education for rehabilitation training.... If the division
of vocational rehabilitation ... certifies to the
industrial commission of Utah in writing that the
employee has fully cooperated with the division of
vocational rehabilitation in its efforts to rehabilitate
him, and in the opinion of the division the employee
may not be rehabilitated, the commission shall order
that there be paid to the employee weekly benefits....
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (1974)(repealed 1988
Utah Laws, ch. 116, §4).
(FN3.) The term "odd lot" was first used by Judge
Moulton in the case of Cardiff Corp. v. Hall, 1 K.B.
1009(1911):
[T]here are cases in which the onus of sh[o]wing that
suitable work can in fact be obtained does fall upon
the employer who claims that the incapacity of the
workman is only partial. If the accident has left the
workman so injured that he is incapable of becoming
an ordinary workman of average capacity in any well
known branch of the labour market~if in other words

*158_ (FN4.) After his retirement, Hoskings moved
from Salt Lake City, Utah. He now has homes in
Ivins and Vernal, Utah. As the Idaho Supreme Court
stated, "[a] claimant should not be permitted to
achieve permanent disability by changing his place of
residence." Lyons, 565 P.2d at 1364 n. 3. Therefore,
in this case, in considering whether Salt Lake City
Corporation met its burden, evidence of job
availability in Salt Lake City, Ivins, and Vernal, Utah,
would all be germane. See id.
(FN5.) The first prong of the odd lot doctrine, whether
the employee can perform the duties required in his
or her occupation, is not at issue in this appeal.
(FN6.) Utah R. Evid. 801 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written
assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is
intended by the person as an assertion.

(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted.
(FN7.) One of the motives behind the "odd lot"
doctrine is a desire to encourage efforts by a claimant
to rehabilitate himself. See 1C Arthur Larson & Lex
K. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation §
57.51(f), at 10-357 to -359 (1995). Therefore, courts
are careful to avoid penalizing or discouraging a
claimant from attempting to rehabilitate himself in
some type of special work setting. Id. See also note
4.
(FN8.) To the extent this interpretation raises a
possible due process concern, as suggested by Salt
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Lake City Corporation at oral argument, we note that
the Legislature has amended this statute to allow for a
mandatory hearing regarding the issue of
rehabilitation. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (1994)
currently reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
(6)(a) A finding by the commission of permanent
total disability is not final, unless otherwise agreed to
by the parties, until:

(iii) the commission, after notice to the parties, holds
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a hearing, unless otherwise stipulated, to consider
evidence regarding rehabilitation and to review any
reemployment plan submitted by the employer or its
insurance carrier under Subsection (6)(a)(ii)....
(FN9.) Of course, the employer does not become an
employment agency for the applicant. The employer
is not required to find a particular position for an
applicant, much less arrange for an interview.
Rather, the employer must only prove that an actual
job does exist in the usual residence or residences of
the applicant and that he or she has a reasonable
opportunity to be employed in that job.
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